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Behavioral Economics Applied:
Loss Causation
Robert A. Prentice*
Current securities fraud doctrine applying section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 set a high bar for civil damages plaintiffs who must plead and
prove both loss causation and transaction causation in order to prevail.
Such a strict standard is not demanded by the law, given that the
purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was to provide more protection for investors than had the common
law of fraud. Nonetheless, the courts, especially the Supreme Court in
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, have chosen to impose this additional
requirement.
This Article examines the behavioral psychology literature, much of
which is traceable to the work of Nobel Prize-winner Daniel Kahneman,
in order to determine whether such a strict standard is warranted as a
policy matter. As it turns out, there is substantial evidence that people
often make less-than-rational judgments regarding causation, can be
manipulated to find causation where none exists, and mis-assign
causation. This evidence argues for a high standard for proving loss
causation in order to protect securities fraud defendants from
unwarranted liability. Yet, there is also evidence of a psychological
tendency to “blame the victim,” which suggests that perhaps it is
plaintiffs who need the law’s protection.

* Professor of Business Law and Business Ethics, McCombs School of Business, University of
Texas at Austin.
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“[Causation] is the cement of the universe.”1

– Hume
INTRODUCTION
In his recent book, The Moral Molecule, Paul Zak writes that the
standard economics account of “rational self-interest is bupkis when it
comes to real people.”2 While I find this an overstatement, I have long
been aware of a meaningful gap between the rational choice theory
account of how people make decisions and how I, and people I know,
make decisions. I first cited Daniel Kahneman’s heuristics and biases
literature twenty-one years ago in an invited article on products liability,
in which a co-author and I argued that requiring consumers to bargain
for the exact “accident level”3 they wanted in a product was unlikely to
be as safe or efficient as imposing product liability upon designers and
makers of products who, with a conscious decision to add a safety
feature, can prevent injury to thousands of consumers whose minds will
inevitably wander while driving a car, using a lawn mower, or working
on an assembly line.4
Because I teach securities regulation, I often have returned to the
work of Professors Kahneman and Tversky and their academic progeny
to analyze various securities law issues, often taking the view that a
purely contractarian approach to securities law that requires investors to
protect themselves from fraud by making optimally rational decisions is
unlikely to produce fair and efficient capital markets.5 While conceding

1. DAVID HUME, AN ABSTRACT OF A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 32 (1740).
2. PAUL J. ZAK, THE MORAL MOLECULE: THE SOURCE OF LOVE AND PROSPERITY 8 (2012).
3. See AM. LAW INST., 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: REPORTERS’
STUDY 205–07 (1991) (arguing that consumers should presumptively choose their own “accident
level”).
4. Robert A. Prentice & Mark Roszkowski, “Tort Reform” and the Liability “Revolution”:
Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 251, 293 nn.213, 218
(1991–1992). It is natural to cite Kahneman. See Amitai Etzioni, Behavioral Economics: Next
Steps, 34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 277, 284 (2011) (describing Kahneman as “the most influential
behavioral economist”); Russell Korobkin, Daniel Kahneman’s Influence on Legal Theory, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1349, 1354 (2013) (“Professor Kahneman is not a law professor, yet his work
has been cited in 2810 law journal articles. Even more impressive, the number of citations to his
work in law journals has continued on a steady upward trajectory for the last three decades, even
though his most influential articles were published in the 1970s.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
5. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of
Disclosure, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 1059 (arguing that moral licensing phenomenon means that the
substantive fiduciary duty standard is preferable to a mere disclosure rule in protecting investors
from abuse by stockbrokers); Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (2003) (defending heuristics and biases
literature and its potential for improving policy prescriptions); Robert A. Prentice, Enron: A Brief
Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417 (2003) (explaining how nonrational decision-making
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that government regulation is far from perfect,6 I have argued (in a
debate that is admittedly unsettled) that securities regulation involving
disclosure requirements, antifraud rules, punishment for insider trading,
and private as well as public enforcement has been associated with
lower costs of capital, stronger capital market development, and
stronger economic growth.7
When I received an early notice of the program for the Second
Annual Institute for Investor Protection Conference, “Behavioral
Economics and Investor Protection,” at the Loyola University Chicago
School of Law, and saw that I had been arbitrarily placed in a session
labeled “Behavioral Economics Applied: Expert Witnesses, Event
Studies, Loss Causation, and Damages Calculations,” I thought I might
just examine the behavioral and cognitive literature regarding how
people think about causation. The hope was to see what the literature
had to say about the current law of loss causation in the most significant

by corporate actors can cause scandals); Robert A. Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in
Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337 [hereinafter
Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses] (suggesting that limitations on rational decision-making by
investors leaves them particularly susceptible to securities fraud when contract-based defenses
such as “no reliance” clauses are enforced); Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?
Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002)
(arguing that various heuristics and biases that limit the efficacy of investor decision-making
render it unlikely that completely deregulating the securities field would be a good idea); Robert
A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud
Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 (2000) (arguing that the behavioral literature renders inaccurate
the oft-stated legal presumption that auditors act rationally to maintain reputational capital);
Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent
Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597 (2000) (arguing that strong evidence of pervasive self-serving
bias makes it unlikely that accounting firms can provide a broad-range of legal services to audit
clients yet stay objective and independent in performing the audit function).
6. And, as the securities markets become more and more complicated, crafting effective
regulation has clearly become more and more difficult. The seeming impossibility of crafting a
workable version of the Volcker Rule pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act is an example. See Kevin
Wack, Senate Dems Sharply Criticize OCC’s Handling of JPM Trades, AM. BANKER, June 6,
2012 (quoting Senator Pat Toomey as saying Dodd-Frank gave them “an impossible job”).
7. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device,
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2010) (focusing on insider trading regulation); Robert A. Prentice, SarbanesOxley: The Evidence regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703 (2007)
(examining the impact of one provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Robert A. Prentice & David B.
Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?,
95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007) (looking at the impact of several Sarbanes-Oxley provisions); Frank B.
Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
333 (2006) (pointing to a beneficial impact of vigorous securities regulation); Robert A. Prentice,
The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775 (2006) (defending the impact of
securities regulation). While I believe in securities regulation, it is very difficult to determine the
optimum level of regulation in a wide range of areas, and there is no doubt that too much
regulation can be, and often is, harmful.
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antifraud provisions in American securities law: section 10(b)8 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act and its attendant Rule 10b-5.9
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the current state
of the law of causation in section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 litigation. It
concludes that the current state of the law, although quite demanding of
plaintiffs, contains sufficient vagueness to give judges the flexibility to
occasionally give plaintiffs a break when they believe they detect a
meritorious case or particularly odious conduct by defendants. Part II
examines the behavioral and cognitive literature to determine how
people typically think of causation, looking at both the strengths and the
weaknesses of human decision making in this area. Part III then
discusses the implications of the psychology literature for the state of
the law, asking whether the literature sheds any light upon the
appropriateness of the very stringent loss causation standard in
securities fraud litigation.
I. THE LAW OF CAUSATION UNDER SECTION 10(B)
A. Introduction
Causation is critical in every area of the law. As a general rule,
causation has two parts. Actual cause (also known as cause in fact) is a
test of exclusion applying a “but for” or sine qua non approach. If
courts can say that “but for” the defendant’s wrong the plaintiff’s injury
8. Section 10(b) reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
9. Rule 10b-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
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would not have occurred, then courts look to the second requirement,
inquiring as “to whether there is proximate cause [or loss causation], an
inquiry driven by policy considerations such as whether the law should
hold the defendant legally responsible for the harm caused by the
defendant’s [wrong].”10
B. The Early Days of the Rule 10b-5 Cause of Action
In securities fraud law specifically, Professor Olazábal has pointed
out that in the earliest days of Rule 10b-5 civil litigation, the courts did
not expressly require a plaintiff to prove what is variously called
proximate cause or loss causation.11 In List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,12 for
example, the court cited the original Restatement of Torts for the
proposition that reliance (apparently alone) ensures that “the conduct of
the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.”13
Thus, as the Rule 10b-5 cause of action originated, plaintiffs needed
to establish only transaction causation (i.e., “Defendant’s lie caused me
to buy the securities which I later had to sell at a loss”). Plaintiffs did
not have to prove that the securities’ decline in price was caused by the
lie specifically. After all, “but for” the defendant’s lie that caused
plaintiffs to purchase the shares, plaintiffs would not have lost money in
connection with that purchase. Plaintiffs apparently needed to establish
nothing more.
Requiring only reliance was not an unreasonable approach. It was
arguably more pro-plaintiff than the common law rule of fraud, which
generally required proof of both loss causation and transaction
causation.14 While setting pleading and other standards for Rule 10b-5
litigation, courts are constantly trying to balance competing policy
interests—protecting investors on the one hand versus avoiding
vexatious litigation on the other15—and section 10(b) was meant to
provide more protection from fraud for securities purchasers than did

10. Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural
Psychological Critique of Tort Law’s Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 195, 200 (2004) (emphasis added).
11. Ann Morales Olazábal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post-Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 337, 343 (2006).
12. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
13. Id. at 462 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938)).
14. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 110, at 767 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the
measure of damages in tort actions).
15. See Brandon J. Stoker, Note, Opening the Rule 10b-5 Floodgates: Ninth Circuit Split in
Gilead Sciences Leaves the Loss Causation Pleading Standard in Limbo, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV.
301, 312–13.
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the common law.16 Therefore, such a pro-plaintiff departure from the
common law was reasonable.
C. Advent of the Loss Causation Requirement
It did not take long, however, for courts to begin requiring not only
transaction causation (reliance), but also loss causation (proximate
cause).17 In other words, plaintiffs had to prove not only that the
defendant’s lie caused them to buy the securities, but also that the lie
(and its ultimate disclosure) caused the eventual price decline. To use
an outlandish but hopefully clarifying example, assume that Defendant
Stockbroker lies to plaintiffs, telling them that ABC Company’s
engineers have designed a breakthrough product that will blow
competitors out of the water. There is no such product, but plaintiffs
believe the lie and therefore buy ABC stock at $30/share. A week later,
an earthquake levels ABC’s corporate offices, killing its entire
management team and destroying its most valuable asset (the building).
ABC’s stock price sinks to zero. “But for” the lie, plaintiffs would
never have purchased the shares and therefore would not have lost $30
on each of them. The courts, however, would view this as establishing
only transaction causation. The earthquake caused the actual drop in
stock price, so plaintiffs cannot establish loss causation and will go
home empty handed.
The loss causation requirement truly came into its own in cases such
as Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp.,18 where plaintiffs claimed that
16. Section 10(b) is based on the common law of fraud. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,
640 F.2d 534, 547 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F.
Supp. 2d 589, 595 (D.N.J. 2001). See also Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir.
1975) (“[C]ommon law fraud concepts underlie the securities laws and provide guidance as to
their reach and application . . . .”). The Supreme Court often accesses the common law for
guidance regarding the meaning of section 10(b). See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 341 (2005); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231, 244 n.22 (1988); Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980). Significantly, section 10(b) was meant to strengthen, not weaken that
common law protection. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (1968)
(noting that section 10(b) should be interpreted so as to liberalize the common law in order to
effectuate its remedial purpose). The Supreme Court has agreed, holding as an example that “[a]
fundamental purpose” of the federal securities laws, including section 10(b), was to replace the
common law fraud regime’s caveat emptor rule in order “to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963). See also Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities
Class Actions?, 63 BUS. LAW. 25, 30 (2007) (“[T]he federal securities laws were passed because
common law remedies for fraud on investors were inadequate in modern anonymous securities
markets.”).
17. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement, Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
18. 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990).
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the defendant promoters had convinced them to invest $600,000 in oil
and gas limited partnerships in 1981 and that by 1984 the interests were
worthless.19 Plaintiffs alleged that had it not been for the defendants’
misrepresentations and omissions regarding their competence and
integrity, they would never have purchased the interests and therefore
could not have lost any money.20 Plaintiffs did not articulate a theory
for why the value of their investment had sunk to zero, and showed little
interest in doing so. This frustrated Judge Posner, who penned the
following about plaintiffs’ unconvincing causation argument:
It happens that 1981 was a peak year for oil prices and that those
prices declined steadily in the succeeding years. When this happened
the profitability of drilling for oil (and gas, which generally is
produced with it) in the continental United States plummeted. The
costs of obtaining oil and gas from our depleted reservoirs are far
higher than the costs in other regions, and drilling for oil and gas is
therefore profitable only in times when prices are very high. Suppose
that because of the unexpected drop in oil prices after 1981, all or the
vast majority of the oil and gas limited partnerships formed in 1981
became worthless. Then it would be highly unlikely that the
plaintiffs’ loss was due to the defendants’ fraud. If the defendants had
come clean in their offering memoranda, then we may assume—
because the plaintiffs allege, and the case was dismissed on the
complaint—that the plaintiffs would not have invested in the
defendants’ limited partnerships. But there were plenty of other oil
and gas limited partnerships they could have invested in. They
wanted to invest in oil and gas limited partnerships; they only wanted
to be sure that the general partners were honest and competent people.
Yet to be honest and competent is not to be gifted with prevision. If
the alternative oil and gas limited partnerships to which these
plaintiffs would have turned had the defendants leveled with them
were also doomed, despite competent and honest management, to
become worthless, the plaintiffs were not hurt by the fraud; it affected
the place but not the time or amount of their loss.21

Ever since the famous Palsgraf case,22 loss causation has generally
been delimited by a requirement of reasonable foreseeability of harm
flowing from the misrepresentation or omission.23 As indicated earlier,

19. Id. at 682.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 684 (citations omitted).
22. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). As Judge Cardozo famously
put it, “‘Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.’” Id. at 102 (citing POLLOCK,
TORTS 463 (12th ed.)). The “Cardozo Standard” holds that a person must be within a foreseeable
zone of danger to assert a valid cause of action for negligent conduct. See id. at 100–01.
23. See Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The generalization
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loss causation is imposed as a policy matter to limit the scope of a
defendant’s liability for losses caused by its wrong. Judge Posner made
his policy preferences clear in Bastian:
No social purpose would be served by encouraging everyone who
suffers an investment loss because of an unanticipated change in
market conditions to pick through offering memoranda with a finetooth comb in the hope of uncovering a misrepresentation. Defrauders
are a bad lot and should be punished, but Rule 10b-5 does not make
them insurers against national economic calamities. If the defendants’
oil and gas ventures failed not because of the personal shortcomings
that the defendants concealed but because of industry-wide
phenomena that destroyed all or most such ventures, then the
plaintiffs, given their demonstrated desire to invest in such ventures,
lost nothing by reason of the defendants’ fraud and have no claim to
damages.24

Thus, the loss causation issue is complicated by the fact that jurors
are being asked to essentially make a policy determination, because that
is what loss causation is all about—deciding who in the causal chain
should bear liability and for how much of the loss and to which
investors.25 Jurors are guided by the somewhat open-ended concept of
“reasonable foreseeability,” but the policy implications of their
decisions lead necessarily to frequent and often decisive judicial
intervention.
D. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
The tone and language of Bastian set a high causation bar for
plaintiffs. Quickly, it became well established across the circuit courts
that plaintiffs were required to plead and prove both transaction
causation and loss causation.26 Statutory developments also mattered;
is that only the loss that might reasonably be expected to result from action or inaction in reliance
on a fraudulent misrepresentation is legally, that is, proximately, caused by the
misrepresentation.”).
24. Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685 (citation omitted).
25. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 180, at 443 (2001) (“The proximate cause
issue, in spite of the terminology, is not about causation at all but about the appropriate scope of
responsibility.”). See also Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87,
96 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In the end, whether loss causation has been demonstrated presents a public
policy question, the resolution of which is predicated upon notions of equity because it
establishes who, if anyone, along the causal chain should be liable for the plaintiffs’ losses.”);
Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1530 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (“While courts often define
proximate cause in terms of how ‘direct’ the connection is between the defendant’s misconduct
and the plaintiff’s loss, or in terms of the foreseeability of the plaintiff’s loss, it appears that
policy considerations external to the transaction between the parties actually govern the courts’
decisions.”).
26. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1494 (2d Cir. 1992); McGonigle v.
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in 1995, Congress overrode President Clinton’s veto to enact the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),27 which attempted to
rebalance securities fraud litigation under Rule 10b-5 in defendants’
favor.28
In enacting the PSLRA, Congress codified the courts’ requirement
that Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs prove both transaction causation and loss
causation.29 The PSLRA also dramatically raised the pleading
requirement for the scienter element of a Rule 10b-5 claim,30 but did not
do likewise with loss causation, which need not be pled with
“particularity” to meet the exacting standards of the PSLRA.31
Causation, however, “may not be pled by way of euphemism alone”32
and must meet the strict standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b),33 which apply when plaintiffs allege fraud.34
A misrepresentation or omission need not be the sole cause of a loss
to be actionable; rather, it need only be “one substantial cause of the
investment’s decline in value,” meaning that “other contributing forces

Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 1992); Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1327–
28 (8th Cir. 1991); Bruschi, 876 F.2d at 1530.
27. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)).
28. Among the PSLRA’s provisions were: a replacement of joint and several liability with
proportional liability, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f); establishment of a statutory “bespeaks caution”
defense, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4); and institution of stricter damages rules, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (loss causation means the
“depreciation in value of the subject security” caused by the misrepresentation); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(e) (Rule 10b-5 recovery is to be based on stock price movements following disclosure of “the
misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action”).
30. Regarding the scienter element of a Rule 10b-5 claim, PSLRA replaced simple notice
pleading with a requirement that any complaint “specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding
the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). Civil damage
plaintiffs shall “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
31. In re A-Power Energy Generation Sys. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. MDL 11-2302-GW(CWx),
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79417, at *19–20 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012); Curry v. Hansen Med., Inc.,
No. C 09-5094 CW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112449, at *39 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012).
32. Metzler, Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.2d 1049, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). See
also Solow v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2927 (RWS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70022, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (holding that conclusory allegations are insufficient to plead loss
causation); In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV 4080 (MP), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2247, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (same).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person’s mind may be alleged generally.”).
34. In re Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC Sec. & Deriv. Litig., No. MJG-08-1961-MDL, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88339, at *14 (D. Md. June 26, 2012).
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will not bar recovery.”35
E. Inflated Value
Both before and after enactment of the PSLRA, the primary method
of establishing loss causation, the inflated value method, allowed
plaintiffs to produce expert witnesses who focused upon the inflated
value of the securities involved (assuming it was a case in which
plaintiffs had bought securities, rather than sold them, in connection
with a fraud). The experts would testify, for example, that because of
ABC Company’s misrepresentations, its market price of $40/share was
inflated by $10/share on the date of plaintiffs’ purchase. Later, when
the truth was exposed, the stock price fell to $30/share; thus, plaintiffs
should recover $10/share under this approach.36
F. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
The Supreme Court rejected the inflated value method of establishing
causation in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,37 where plaintiffs
alleged that Dura, prior to and throughout the class period, made false
statements regarding its profits and future Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) approval of a new asthmatic spray device it
hoped to market.38 On the last day of the class period, Dura announced
that its earnings would be lower than expected, primarily due to slow
drug sales, and its stock price dropped by more than half.39 Eight
months later, Dura announced that the FDA would not approve its new
device and its stock price briefly fell again (almost fully recovering
within a week).40 Dura was a “fraud-on-the-market” case in which the
plaintiffs argued that transaction causation was established via their
reliance upon the market price as an accurate indicator of the value of
the shares.41 The trial judge held that plaintiffs had not adequately
35. Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Robbins v. Koger Props.,
Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997)). See In re A-Power, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79417, at *19–20; Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112449, at *40; Kinnett v. Strayer Educ., Inc.,
Nos. 8:10-cv-2317-T-23MAP, 8:10-cv-2728-T-23MAP (consolidated), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37737, at *53 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2012)
36. See In re Vicuron Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 421, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating
that a simple mathematical calculation is required once liability is assigned).
37. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
38. Id. at 339.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 342. See also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) (allowing
plaintiffs in cases involving publicly traded companies to establish transaction causation
(reliance) without showing that they had individually read or heard the misrepresentations by
showing that they had relied on the market price of the inflated shares).
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alleged loss causation regarding the spray device claims, but the Ninth
Circuit held that plaintiffs’ “inflated value” claims sufficed.42 The
Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit court, with Justice Breyer
writing:
Normally, in cases such as this one (i.e., fraud-on-the-market cases),
an inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately
cause the relevant economic loss.
For one thing, as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the
transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant
possesses equivalent value. Moreover, the logical link between the
inflated share purchase price and any later economic loss is not
invariably strong. Shares are normally purchased with an eye toward a
later sale. But if, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the
relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have
led to any loss. If the purchaser sells later after the truth makes its
way into the marketplace, an initially inflated purchase price might
mean a later loss. But that is far from inevitably so. When the
purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, that
lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industryspecific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken
separately or together account for some or all of that lower price. (The
same is true in respect to a claim that a share’s higher price is lower
than it would otherwise have been—a claim we do not consider
here.) . . .
Given the tangle of factors affecting price, the most logic alone
permits us to say is that the higher purchase price will sometimes play
a role in bringing about a future loss. It may prove to be a necessary
condition of any such loss, and in that sense one might say that the
inflated purchase price suggests that the misrepresentation (using
language the Ninth Circuit used) “touches upon” a later economic
loss. But, even if that is so, it is insufficient. To “touch upon” a loss
is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires.43

Justice Breyer’s primary justification for rejecting the inflated value
approach to establishing loss causation (and damages) is the
unreliability of the method. Many other factors could cause a stock’s
price to decline, especially if there has been a substantial period of time
between the false statement or omission and the truth coming out. Dura
42. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 366
(2005).
43. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 (2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(4), which states that securities fraud plaintiffs bear “the burden of proving” that the
defendant’s misrepresentations “caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover”).
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requires plaintiffs to eliminate losses caused by factors other than
defendant’s fraud from the damage calculation.44
Rather than simply showing an inflated price at the time of purchase,
plaintiffs must produce “proof of a causal connection between the
misrepresentation and the investment’s subsequent decline in value.”45
In a fraud-on-the-market case, as in most Rule 10b-5 cases,46 plaintiffs
must prove not only the fraud-inflated price, but also that “the fraudinduced inflation that was baked into the plaintiff’s purchase price was
subsequently removed from the stock’s price, thereby causing losses to
the plaintiff.”47
G. Two Primary Paths to Establishing Loss Causation
Dura was criticized in some quarters as imposing too high a burden
on plaintiffs,48 but most of the criticism aimed at the decision has
focused on the Court’s insufficient guidance regarding how to
sufficiently plead loss causation.49 If the inflated value method is
44. See William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 888 (2005) (“[T]he adjustment to remove the effect on damages of
nonfraud influences—such as general market movement, new information about the issuer’s
industry, and news about the issuer that is unrelated to the asserted fraud—is critical because
‘damages under Rule 10b-5 are limited to those proximately caused by defendant’s misstatement
[or] omission.’” (quoting 3 THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, §
12.12[3], at 386 (5th ed. 2005))). Justice Breyer’s majority opinion also held that the Ninth
Circuit approach was not consistent with precedent, Dura, 544 U.S. at 343–44, that it undermined
Rule 10b-5 policy (the Bastian notion that securities fraud suits exist to maintain public
confidence in the securities markets by deterring fraud, not by providing insurance against
losses), id. at 345, and that it was inconsistent with the PSLRA’s loss causation requirement. Id.
at 345–46. The PSLRA provision is, as cited above, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4), and Breyer wrote:
The statute thereby makes clear Congress’ intent to permit private securities fraud
actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the
traditional elements of causation and loss. By way of contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s
approach would allow recovery where a misrepresentation leads to an inflated purchase
price but nonetheless does not proximately cause any economic loss. That is to say, it
would permit recovery where these two traditional elements in fact are missing.
Id. at 346.
45. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 725 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
Robbins v. Koger Props, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997)).
46. In non-class action Rule 10b-5 cases, courts are often easier on plaintiffs when applying
loss causation requirements. See, e.g., Lau v. Mezei, No. 10CV4838(KMW), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116608, at *20–21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) (finding it adequate for establishing loss
causation when the plaintiff made “allegations that he was misinformed as to the degree of risk in
the investment, the level of assets that [the companies he was induced to loan money to] had on
hand, and the presence of a senior lender that [one of the borrowers] would pay before Lau . . .”).
47. FindWhatInvestor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1448).
48. See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 811, 870 (2009).
49. See, e.g., Merrit B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J.
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inadequate to plead and prove loss causation, how are plaintiffs to do
so? Justice Breyer gave only vague direction, and since Dura, the lower
courts have struggled to determine exactly how plaintiffs can adequately
meet its loss causation pleading requirements.50
1. Corrective Disclosure
In his observation that the complaint failed “to claim that Dura’s
share price fell significantly after the truth became known,”51 Justice
Breyer suggested that such an allegation would serve to adequately
allege loss causation. Illustrative of a common post-Dura approach to
pleading and proving loss causation is the opinion in the Dell
litigation,52 wherein the court noted two ways in which plaintiffs could
establish loss causation: the corrective disclosure and materialization of
risks approaches.
First, in his opinion in Dura, Justice Breyer adverted to the
Plaintiffs can establish loss
“corrective disclosure” approach.53
causation by showing that defendants corrected a previous false
statement (in Dura, the defendant admitted that, inconsistent with
previous statements, the FDA was not going to approve its new device)
and that the correction caused the stock price drop (which plaintiffs
could not adequately show in Dura).54
In Curry v. Hansen Medical, Inc.,55 the defendant falsely inflated
reported catheter sales, which became clear when it filed its quarterly
report. Analysts expressed surprise and the stock price immediately
declined by approximately twenty percent.56 The link between the
CORP. L. 829, 847 (2006); Bryan L. Phipps, Note, In re Williams Securities Litigation—WCG
Subclass: How Dura Met Daubert, 2010 BYU L. REV. 215, 222.
50. See, e.g., In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 501, 538 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“The
[Dura] Court thus held that a plaintiff must prove loss causation, and cannot do so merely by
showing that the share price was artificially inflated at the time of purchase; but the Court did not
address how a plaintiff could prove loss causation.”).
51. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005).
52. In re Dell Inc. Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
53. Id. at 905–06.
54. Id. at 906–07.
55. No. C09-5094(CW), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112449 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012).
56. Id. at *41. See also In re Jiangbo Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 11-22556-Civ, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 107186, at *52–53 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2012) (“Plaintiffs allege that, through a series
of disclosures regarding [defendant] Jiangbo’s several, and then final, defaults on the 2007 and
2008 Debenture, and Jin’s statements in a conference call about the possibility that Jiangbo might
file for bankruptcy because of its inability to make the debenture payments, the market learned
that Jiangbo’s cash reserves were overstated. Plaintiffs show that, following each disclosure, the
Company’s share prices dropped and trading was ultimately halted on May 31, 2011. These
allegations are sufficient to show loss causation.”); Norfolk Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Ustian, No.
07C7014, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65731, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2009) (“[Plaintiffs] have
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cause and the effect seemed fairly direct, and therefore the court ruled
for the plaintiffs. However, in In re Almost Family, the court
emphasized that misstatements must be revealed and responded to in the
market in order to establish loss causation,57 because “[w]ithout a
revelation, one can only assume that other factors or speculation about
unrevealed matters have caused the decline in stock value (such as
external business conditions).”58 As the court indicated:
Requiring that fraud be revealed or disclosed to the market in order to
adequately plead loss causation is both sensible and efficient. If the
purpose of the loss causation requirement is to ensure that an
investor’s loss is actually caused by a defendant’s fraud, and not an
unrelated circumstance in the market, then a plaintiff cannot satisfy
her pleading requirements while the fraud remains concealed from the
market. Stated another way, the market cannot respond to fraud until
it has been revealed. If the disclosure of a mere risk of fraud was
enough to trigger loss causation, a private cause of action for securities
fraud would accrue every time an allegation or rumor of wrongdoing
circulated.59

2. Materialization of the Risk
The second way to establish loss causation—according to Dell and
most other courts—is the “materialization of the risk” approach.60
These courts argue that if the only way to establish loss causation is to
show defendants made corrective disclosures that led to stock price
drops, no defendant would ever make a corrective disclosure.
Therefore, if the truth materializes in the market through other avenues
and the plaintiffs can adequately link the materialization of the truth to
stock price declines, loss causation is adequately proved.61
Where the alleged misstatement conceals a condition or event, which
then occurs and causes the plaintiff’s loss, it is the materialization of the
identified a series of disclosures—a leakage of information—which indicated that [the
defendant’s] financial statements and accounting practices were unreliable. The market
incorporated this information as the truth about the alleged fraud slowly leaked into the
marketplace and share prices fell after each instance.”).
57. In re Almost Family, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:10-CV-00520-H, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16857, at *32 n.6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2012) (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161,
174 (2d Cir. 2005)).
58. Id. at *33 n.7 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344–45 (2005)).
59. Id. at *37. In Almost Family, the court held that disclosure of an investigation of fraud
was not tantamount to a disclosure of fraud. Id. at *40. See also In re Maxim Integrated Prods.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (agreeing with Almost Family); In
re Dell Inc., Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877, 910 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (same); In re Avista Corp.
Sec. Litig., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220–21 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (same).
60. Dell, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 910–11.
61. Id.
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undisclosed condition or event that causes the loss. “By contrast, where
the alleged misstatement is an intentionally false opinion, the market
will not respond to the truth until the falsity is revealed—i.e. a
corrective disclosure.”62
Plaintiffs can surmount the causation bar by showing either that the
defendant corrected a previous error and the correcting disclosure was
followed shortly by a stock price movement, or the correcting
information materialized in the market over time and such
materialization was roughly correlated with stock price movements.
With that knowledge, plaintiffs are able to separate the effects of fraudrelated stock price inflation from non-fraud risks. The correcting
disclosure method is apparently most appropriate where the defendant is
accused of issuing a false statement; the materialization of the risk
method is most appropriate where the alleged misstatement or omission
conceals a condition or event that then occurs and causes a loss.
Some courts attempt to clarify the materialization of risk approach by
speaking of a “zone of risk,” concluding that loss causation is
sufficiently pled if “the risk that caused the loss was within the zone of
risk concealed by the misrepresentations and omissions alleged by a
disappointed investor.”63 Pursuant to this theory,
[i]f the significance of the truth is such as to cause a reasonable
investor to consider seriously a zone of risk that would be perceived as
remote or highly unlikely by one believing the fraud, and the loss
ultimately suffered is within that zone, then a misrepresentation or
omission as to that information may be deemed a foreseeable or
proximate cause of the loss.64

H. A High Hill to Climb
Generally, though not inevitably, courts apply the loss causation rules
in ways that make life very difficult for plaintiffs. It is certainly
62. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
63. Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 202 (2010). See also Sawant v.
Ramsey, No. 3:07-cv-980(VLB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112151, at *29 (D. Conn. June 21,
2012) (holding in favor of plaintiffs utilizing the zone of risk test); Solow v. Citigroup, Inc., No.
10 Civ. 2927(RWS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70022, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (holding
that plaintiff inadequately pled loss causation using the materialization of risk approach).
64. In re Gen. Elec. Sec. Litig., 857 F. Supp. 2d 367, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting AUSA
Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 235 (2d Cir. 2000) (Winter., J., dissenting)). See
also Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *38
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“The Second Circuit has held that ‘a misstatement or omission is the
proximate cause of an investment loss if the risk that caused the loss was within the zone of risk
concealed by the misrepresentation,’ and that the loss causation inquiry requires ‘both that the
loss be foreseeable and that the loss be caused by the materialization of the concealed risk.’”
(quoting Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005))).
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reasonable to emphasize that “mere temporal proximity” does not
establish loss causation.65 And it is fair to hold that “[p]ost hoc ergo
propter hoc will not do.”66 Hence, the Supreme Court was right in Dura
when it claimed that “[o]ther things being equal, the longer the time
between purchase and sale, the more likely that . . . other factors [than
the fraud that induced the transaction] caused the loss.”67 But more is
going on here than that.
In a recent article, Dain Donelson and I made the point that the
extreme malleability of scienter pleading standards in Rule 10b-5 cases
against outside auditors means that judges have virtually unlimited
discretion to terminate cases at the motion to dismiss stage (if they feel
them unpromising), or to move them along to a likely significant
settlement if their gut feeling tells them that the case has merit.68
The loss causation standards also seem to afford judges meaningful
discretion to punish unseemly behavior if they so choose. While most
cases seem to be quite demanding of plaintiffs when determining loss
causation, consider Dondona v. Goldman Sachs & Co.69 Plaintiffs in
Dondona alleged extraordinarily unattractive behavior on the part of
Goldman Sachs. Plaintiffs alleged that Goldman Sachs took substantial
short positions in mortgage-backed securities when it realized the
mortgage market was going south. While it was going short, the firm
continued to sell those same securities to clients knowing the clients
would get slaughtered in the market.70
In the face of allegations of exceedingly contemptible misconduct
(even by Wall Street standards), the court was relatively forgiving on
the loss causation issue. When Goldman Sachs argued that the entire
economy was hurting during the relevant time period and that this factor

65. In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 501, 547 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
66. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1992).
67. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
68. Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical
Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441 (2012).
69. 847 F. Supp. 2d 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
70. The court indicated:
In particular, Dondona alleges that the Defendants created the Hudson CDOs as part of
a scheme to decrease Goldman’s subprime exposure at the expense of its investors by
shorting those same CDOs; that Defendants failed to disclose this strategy to investors;
and that Defendants failed to disclose that they did not reasonably believe that the
Hudson CDOs would be profitable for investors like Dodona. Dodona claims it
suffered damages when the Hudson CDO notes were liquidated and when it sold them
at a loss.
Dondona, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 635–36. For popular accounts of these types of transactions, see
BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE 278–81 (2010); GRETCHEN
MORGENSON & JOSHUA ROSNER, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT 282 (2011).
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likely contributed mightily to plaintiffs’ losses, the court held that
plaintiffs did not have to rule out all alternative causal explanations in
order to survive a motion to dismiss.71 Other courts in close cases also
have appeared to go a little easy on plaintiffs, reasoning that “[l]oss
causation becomes most critical at the proof stage.”72
But most courts seem to reject the view that loss causation should not
receive close scrutiny at the motion to dismiss stage.73 The court in
Phillips v. Triad Guaranty, Inc., for example, held that even at the
motion to dismiss stage, it is the plaintiffs’ burden to adequately allege
the fraud’s causal impact on plaintiffs’ losses and to distinguish the
impact of the fraud from other factors, such as a market-wide collapse
in defendant’s industry.74 The Eleventh Circuit recently held that
to succeed in a fraud-on-the-market case, it is not enough to
point to a decline in the security’s price after the truth of the
misrepresented matter was revealed to the public. The plaintiff
must also offer evidence sufficient to allow the jury to separate
portions of the price decline attributable to causes unrelated to
the fraud, leaving only the part of the price decline attributable
to the dissipation of the fraud-induced inflation.75
71. Dondona, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 644. See also King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche
Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that the law does not
require plaintiffs to plead facts “sufficient to exclude other non-fraud explanations”).
72. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 427 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007). See also In re
Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC Sec. & Deriv. Litig., 876 F. Supp. 2d 616, 647 (D. Md. 2012) (“So
long as the plaintiff alleges facts to support a theory that is not facially implausible, the court’s
skepticism is best reserved for later stages of the proceedings when the plaintiff’s case can be
rejected on evidentiary grounds.” (citation omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Phillips v. Triad Guar., Inc., No. 1:09CV71, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10987, at *8
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that close attention to the loss causation
issue was not warranted at the motion to dismiss stage).
74. Id. at *12–13.
75. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 726 (11th Cir. 2012). Note that
even if plaintiffs meet Dura’s standards and thereby demonstrate loss causation by proving that
defendant’s fraud was a substantial factor in causing their loss, they still may fail to recover by
not adequately establishing their damages with specificity. They need to prove a “precise
apportionment” of what percentage of the damages came from the fraud and what percentage was
caused by other factors for which defendants are not responsible. Id. The Fourth Circuit has
noted:
[I]n a given case, a jury could properly conclude that (1) the plaintiff proved the
defendant’s fraud constituted a substantial cause of plaintiff’s loss and so find the
defendant liable but (2) the plaintiff failed to provide a method to discern by ‘just and
reasonable inference’ the amount of plaintiff’s loss solely caused by defendant’s fraud,
and so refuse to award the plaintiff any damages.
Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223, 232 (4th Cir. 2004). Because of various confounding
factors that could exist, plaintiffs “must offer some evidence separating the various causes of the
decline in the security’s price even to establish loss causation. Otherwise the jury has no basis on
which to conclude that the dissipation of the fraud-induced inflation was a substantial factor in
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This requirement is a challenging standard to meet.
As an indication of how hard the current standard can be on
plaintiffs, consider Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., where
pension fund State-Boston brought a Rule 10b-5 action against
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. (“Bancorp”), claiming that the bank holding
company had misrepresented the level of risk associated with
commercial real estate loans held by its subsidiary, BankAtlantic.76
There is little doubt that the misrepresentation existed, but the plaintiff
also had to establish loss causation and hired an expert witness in an
attempt to do so.
The expert, a financial analyst named Candace Preston, performed an
event study77 to determine how much of the decline in the price of
Bancorp’s stock on two key corrective disclosure dates (April 26, 2007,
and October 26, 2007) was attributable to company-specific factors
rather than industry factors or general market conditions. She used the
S&P 500 Index to eliminate any part of the stock price drop that might
have been caused by market-wide factors. To eliminate industryspecific factors, she utilized the NASDAQ Bank Index, which tracks the
stock price of hundreds of banks and bank holding companies. She
found a “statistical fit” between those two indexes and Bancorp’s stock
price movement.78
The court described the expert’s testimony
regarding the first key disclosure dates in this way:
On April 26, 2007, although Bancorp’s stock price dropped more than
5 percent, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ Bank Index each fell less
than 1 percent. Preston concluded based on those indexes that, of the
56-cent April 26 price decline, 55 cents could not be explained by
market or industry factors and therefore must have resulted from
company-specific factors. To isolate the amount attributable to the
alleged fraud, as opposed to other company-specific factors, Preston
looked at several analysts’ projections of Bancorp’s earnings per share
for 2007. Those projections, she observed, dropped by an average of
15 cents after the April 26 disclosures. Based on information in the
analysts’ reports, Preston concluded that two-thirds of that drop in
Bancorp’s projected earnings were attributable to the disclosure of

bringing about the plaintiff’s loss.” Hubbard, 688 F.3d at 726 (citing In re Scientific Atl., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2010)).
76. 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012).
77. Event studies are currently the most common way for plaintiffs to establish the magnitude
of loss caused by a fraud. Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation
and Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199, 230–31. However,
there are increasing questions about the viability of the event study in a wide variety of situations.
Id. at 227.
78. Hubbard, 688 F.3d at 722.
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previously concealed risk in the commercial real estate portfolio on
April 26. She then reasoned that the same proportion of the 55-cent
residual decline in Bancorp’s stock price—two-thirds, or 37 cents—
was attributable to the fraud.79

Using similar methodology, Preston also attributed all thirty-eight
percent of the October 26, 2007 drop in the stock price to
materialization of the risk that defendant had been hiding.80
The expert’s work was for naught, however, as the court rejected her
conclusions because of a failure, in the court’s eyes, to adequately
account for the potential impact of a general collapse of the Florida real
estate market, which could also have impacted Bancorp’s stock price.81
79. Id. at 722 (footnotes omitted).
80. The court stated:
On October 26, 2007, as Bancorp’s stock fell 38 percent, the S&P 500 rose about 1
percent, and the NASDAQ Bank Index rose 2 percent. Preston concluded that but for
company-specific factors, Bancorp’s stock price would have risen on that day. She
thus found a residual decline of $3.15, even more than the actual decline of $2.93. To
exclude company-specific factors other than the fraud, Preston looked at analyst
reports responding to the October 25 disclosures. Because analysts seemed most
concerned about the deterioration of the commercial real estate portfolio, Preston
concluded that the entire residual decline was attributable to the disclosure of
previously concealed risk in that portfolio. She therefore opined that the entire October
26 price decline of $2.93 was attributable to the fraud.
Id. at 722.
81. The court held:
Preston failed, however, to account for the effects of the collapse of the Florida real
estate market. The NASDAQ Bank Index may be well suited to capture the effects of
national trends in the banking industry, such as the broader national financial crisis that
reached its nadir in 2008. But in 2007, Florida, having benefitted more than most
states from the real estate boom of the previous years, was hit harder than most by the
ensuing bust. And Florida financial institutions, as Preston admitted on crossexamination, made up only a small percentage of the NASDAQ Bank Index. That
index, therefore, would be inappropriate for the task of filtering out the effects of
industry-wide factors that might affect the stock price of a bank, or of the holding
company of a bank, whose assets were concentrated in loans tied to Florida real estate
in 2007.
BankAtlantic is just such a bank. As Bancorp acknowledged in several public SEC
filings during the class period, BankAtlantic’s assets were concentrated in loans tied to
Florida real estate. As a result, BankAtlantic and Bancorp were particularly
susceptible to any deterioration in the Florida real estate market, in addition to any
national developments. To support a finding that Bancorp’s misstatements were a
substantial factor in bringing about its losses, therefore, State-Boston had to present
evidence that would give a jury some indication, however rough, of how much of the
decline in Bancorp’s stock price resulted not from the fraud but from the general
downturn in the Florida real estate market—the risk of which Bancorp is not alleged to
have concealed. State-Boston failed to do so. None of its evidence excluded the
possibility that class members’ losses resulted not from anything specific about
BankAtlantic’s commercial real estate portfolio that Bancorp hid from the public, but
from market forces that it had warned of—and that would likely have caused
significant losses for an investor in any bank with a significant credit portfolio in
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Because the expert testimony did not adequately rule out other potential
causes of the stock price drop, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant.82
Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.83 provides a road map for
defendants to avoid liability on loss causation grounds. The defendant,
a cable TV set-top box maker, had allegedly engaged in channel
stuffing to cover up decreasing demand for its products and hidden the
practice from investors.84 The truth about the weak demand came to
light when the defendant announced sales numbers in July 2001, and its
stock price immediately dropped, precipitating a Rule 10b-5 lawsuit.85
The plaintiffs’ expert witness performed an event study that sought to
disaggregate the effects of the fraud from overall industry-wide factors
that would have affected defendant and its competitors.86 The
defendant’s July 2001 announcement, however, included not only the
inventory data, but also other more general information.87 That addition
spelled the end for plaintiffs. The Eleventh Circuit held that the
plaintiff had adequately disaggregated the effect of defendant’s fraud on
its stock price from that of industry-wide factors, but had not
disaggregated that effect from the impact of other company-specific
factors, such as its customers’ reduced digital marketing efforts.88 More
specifically, the court said:
The press releases and interviews that Plaintiffs have identified as
presenting the “corrective disclosure” in this case include multiple
pieces of non-fraud-related information (for example, the uncertain
economic climate, reduced marketing by [defendant’s] customers,
unexpectedly slow deployment of interactive digital cable services)
that qualify as “other possible depressing factors”: revelations not
about the supposed “channel stuffing.” The other factors could have
caused some amount of the identified price drop. Absent sufficient
disaggregation of the relative price effects of these other different
pieces of information, no fact-finder would be able to determine that

commercial real estate in Florida in 2007. Bancorp is therefore entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
Id. at 729–30 (citations and footnotes omitted).
82. Id. at 730.
83. 489 F. App’x 339 (11th Cir. 2012).
84. Phillips, 489 F. App’x at 340–41. Generally, channel stuffing occurs when an actor pulls
sales from “future fiscal periods into the present fiscal period—by way of encouragement,
discounts, or incentives—to increase current fiscal period performance.” Id. at 340 n.1.
85. Id. at 341.
86. Id. at 343.
87. See id. at 342–43 (holding that the information released in July 2001 regarding a generally
slowing economy was a confounding variable).
88. Id. at 343.
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the revelation of the supposed “channel stuffing” activities in this case
satisfied the pertinent causation requirement.89

Thus, if defendants release other adverse information at the time they
issue their corrective statement, they may make it well-nigh impossible
for plaintiffs to meet their loss causation burden.90
The bottom line is that the stock market is very noisy.91 Its workings
are complex and the stock price movements of individual stocks are
often mysterious. The largest market crashes tend not to correspond to
any particular announcement of negative news,92 and the market often
moves little in response to what appear on their face to be significant
news developments.93 “The entire field of behavioral finance exists to
point out that often a stock price moves up or down because of which
month it is, whether the sun is out, [or] whether a particular team has
won a championship . . . .”94
Determining why a particular company’s stock price has gone up or
down is often exceedingly difficult. Studies indicate that the great
majority of individual stock price movements are not due to companyspecific factors, but rather are caused by general market and industry
factors and conditions.95 Moreover, the microstructure of stock trading
89. Id. at 342–43.
90. See Dunbar & Sen, supra note 77, at 242 (“Complications arise when there is confounding
news at the time of the revelation of the relevant truth. Although an event study can detect when
a stock-price decline on such news is statistically significant, it cannot by itself determine which
of simultaneous events caused the price drop.”).
91. See Prentice & Donelson, supra note 68, at 21 (noting that stock prices are often based on
“traders’ fortuitous hunches and perhaps little else” (citing WILLIAM BAUMOL THE STOCK
MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 51 (1965))); Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 530
(1986) (“Noise makes financial markets possible, but also makes them imperfect.”); Robert
Bloomfield et al., How Noise Trading Affects Markets: An Experimental Analysis, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2275, 2301 (2009) (noting that noise traders “introduce complex effects into market
behavior”); J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON.
703, 735 (1990) (“[N]oise trading can lead to a large divergence between market prices and
fundamental values.”).
92. See David M. Cutler et al., What Moves Stock Prices?, 15 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 4, 4
(1989) (“[The] apparent absence of fundamental economic news coincident with the dramatic
stock market movement of late 1987 is particularly difficult to reconcile with the standard
view.”).
93. Id.
94. Prentice & Donelson, supra note 68, at 21 (concluding that psychological models of
“irrational decision-making” can help explain pricing in speculative markets (citing Kenneth
Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 J. ECON. INQUIRY 1, 7–8 (1982))). See
also Fisher, supra note 44, at 901–08 (discussing behavioral finance’s assault on the efficient
market theory).
95. See J.C. de Swann & Neil W.C. Harper, Getting What You Pay For with Stock Options,
MCKINSEY Q., Spring 2003, at 152 (noting research finding that, from 1991 to 2000, market and
industry factors accounted for roughly seventy percent of the returns of individual companies,
while company-specific factors accounted for around thirty percent). To the extent that
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markets can affect stock price movements in meaningful ways. The
simple interaction between new order flow and the particular pattern of
orders that are already in the pipeline can have a significant and
confounding influence on stock price movement.96 “[A] lot of stock
price movement . . . has nothing to do with current news, but instead is
an artifact of the interactions between new order flow and the particular
pattern of orders that happens to be stored in the [stockbrokers’] book at
a moment in time.”97
There is the occasional case where corporations make corrective
statements and the announcement is followed immediately by a stock
price drop.98 But generally, causation is not so clear, and in those grayarea cases it is typically very difficult for plaintiffs to adequately
exclude other possible causes and thereby establish loss causation. Is
such a strict standard justified?

macroeconomic factors affect a company’s stock price, lay people typically will have great
difficulty understanding those causal relations. See David Leiser & Ronen Aroch, Lay
Understanding of Macroeconomic Causation: The Good-Begets-Good Heuristic, 58 APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 370, 378 (2009) (noting that “[t]he depth of explanation of economic concepts is low
in all segments of the population” and that lay people tend to use a simple “good-begets-good
heuristic to explain causal links”).
96. In my article with Donelson, we gave this example:
Assume that an insider learns positive, material, confidential information and calls his
stockbroker, wishing to buy 1000 shares of his employer’s stock. The broker routes
the order to a stock exchange and the best available sell offer is a limit order at
$20/share for 500 shares. The system will fill that order and then look for the next
lowest limit order in order to fill the request for 500 more shares. If the next lowest
limit order is at $21 for 600 shares, the market’s ask price will move to $21. If the next
lowest limit order is at $25, the ask price will move to $25. The price movement is
substantially affected not by the substance of the material information or even the
volume of the order. The biggest impact derives from the microstructure of the market
itself.
Donelson & Prentice, supra note 68, at 21 n.112. See also ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF
WEALTH 182 (2006); J. Doyne Farmer et al., What Really Causes Large Price Changes?, 4
QUANT FIN. 383, 393 (2004); Fabrizio Lillo et al., Theory for Long Memory in Supply and
Demand, 71 PHYSICAL REV. E. 066122-1, 066122-2 (2005), available at http://pre.aps.org/pdf/
PRE/v71/i6/e066122
97. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND
THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 182, 183 (2007). Bookstaber argues that the demand for
liquidity, rather than information about companies, is the “primary driver of the day-to-day
movement in [securities] prices.” Id. at 182.
98. Sawant v. Ramsey, No. 2:11-cv-566-FtM-29SPC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112151 (D.
Conn. June 21, 2012), presents an example of a slam-dunk in loss causation. Plaintiff’s expert
testified that defendant’s stock price soared immediately after a false announcement that it had
concluded a “transaction” with Wal-Mart, and dropped like a stone immediately following a
correcting statement issued six weeks later. Furthermore, defendant produced no evidence that
any factor other than the false statement had affected the stock price. Id. at *26–32.
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II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CAUSATION
A. Introduction
Causation is, as Hume suggested in this Article’s opening epigraph,
critical in life. And, as it turns out, critical in law. Kahneman and
Tversky have pointed out that people organize their views of the
physical and social world in terms of causal relationships.99
But causation is a devilishly complicated notion. A quick perusal of
The Oxford Handbook of Causation indicates that there are multiple
standard approaches to causation—regularity theories,100 counterfactual
theories,101 probabilistic theories,102 causal process theories,103 and
agency and interventionist theories.104 There are alternative approaches
that involve causal powers and capacities,105 anti-reductionism,106
causal modeling,107 mechanisms,108 and causal pluralism.109 There are
specialized approaches to causation in different disciplines, including
law,110 social sciences,111 biology,112 and quantum mechanics.113 The

99. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemes in Judgments Under
Uncertainty, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 117, 117 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (“It is a psychological commonplace that people strive to achieve a
coherent interpretation of the events that surround them, and that the organizations of events by
schemas of cause-effect relations serves to achieve this goal.”). See also Lawrence M. Solan,
Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (2003)
[hereinafter Solan, Cognitive Foundations] (“We conceptualize the world in terms of events and
we conceptualize events in terms of cause and result. We do all of this automatically and in
circumstances having little or nothing to do with moral attribution, which means that use of these
constructs in the attribution of responsibility comes with little cognitive cost.”).
100. Stathis Psillos, Regularity Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION 131
(Helen Beebe et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK].
101. L.A. Paul, Counterfactual Theories, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 158.
102. Jon Williamson, Probabilistic Theories, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 185.
103. Phil Dowe, Causal Process Theories, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 213.
104. James F. Woodward, Agency and Interventionist Theories, in OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 100, at 234.
105. Stephen Mumford, Causal Powers and Capacities, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note
100, at 265.
106. John W. Carroll, Anti-Reductionism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 279.
107. Christopher Hitchcock, Causal Modeling, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at
299.
108. Stuart Glennan, Mechanisms, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 315.
109. Peter Godfrey-Smith, Causal Pluralism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 326.
110. Jane Stapleton, Causation in the Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 744.
There is a debate among legal scholars regarding the role of causation. Compare Christopher H.
Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risk, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 466–68
(1990) (“It is appropriate to sever the defendant-causation tie, from the ex ante view, because the
full moral and legal significance of a defendant’s action is appraisable at the moment of action.”),
with Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987) (arguing
for the necessity of a strong causation element in tort law).
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field of psychology, for example, finds causality if the supposed effect
happens after the supposed cause, if the two correlate or co-vary, and if
there are no alternative explanations.114
B. How Do People Think About Causation?
Given the importance to survival of understanding causal forces as
people interact with their environment, it is unsurprising that people
have evolved a strong ability to understand causation.115 Causal
thinking usually involves both parts of the brain’s two-track thinking
system—one swift, automatic, and unconscious (System I), and the
other slower, deliberate, and conscious (System II).116
There is evidence that six month-old babies perceive causality,117 and
it is clear that by the age of three, children constantly form hypotheses

111. Harold Kincaid, Causation in the Social Sciences, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note
100, at 726. One of the most recent developments in statistical methodology for drawing causal
inferences in social science is synthetic control, which aims to overcome difficulties in causal
inferences in studies involving small samples or few occurrences of the phenomenon of interest.
See Adam R. Fremeth et al., Did Chrysler Benefit from Government Assistance?: Making Causal
Inferences in Small Samples Using Synthetic Control Methodology (Sept. 26, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2135294
(describing origins of synthetic control methodology, giving examples of its uses, and applying it
to conclude that Chrysler would have sold approximately twenty percent more vehicles in the
United States through summer 2011 had it refused a government bailout and instead relied on
private financing).
112. Samir Okasha, Causation in Biology, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 707.
113. Richard Healey, Causation in Quantum Mechanics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note
100, at 673.
114. See Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in
the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System, 9 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 47 (2001) (“According to
the discipline of psychology, a given relationship between two events is a cause-effect
relationship if, and only if, it satisfies the following three conditions: (a) Time-Order, (b)
Correlation or Co-variation, and (c) Absence of Alternative Explanations.”).
115. Patricia W. Cheng & Laura R. Novick, A Probabilistic Contrast Model of Causal
Induction, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 545, 545 (1990).
116. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 51–60 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds.,
2002); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO IS
RATIONAL? (1999). To focus on thinking related solely to causation, causal cognition consists of
both causal learning and causal reasoning. According to Danks, causal learning consists of both
causal perception and causal inference. Causal perception is System I thinking—the relatively
automatic and irresistible perception of a certain sequence of events involving causation. Causal
inference, on the other hand, is System II higher-order thinking, based largely on statistical
inference. David Danks, The Psychology of Causal Perception and Reasoning, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 452.
117. See Alan M. Leslie & Stephanie Keeble, Do Six-Month-Old Infants Perceive Causality?,
25 COGNITION 265, 282 (1987).
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about the causes of events they observe.118 These children do not need
to be trained; these interests and abilities have evolved naturally. And
it’s not just children, of course. All adults also constantly think about
causation. Hart and Honoré’s famous book, Causation in the Law,
emphasized that the common law regarding causation reflects people’s
common sense reasoning.119 Hart and Honoré are certainly not alone in
emphasizing the layperson’s common sense as the key yardstick for
causation determinations.120 But how reliable is our common sense?
How good are we at drawing proper conclusions regarding causality?
Obviously we must be reasonably good at it; otherwise we would not
have survived the evolutionary process. Yet there is ample evidence
that our abilities in this area—as with most other areas of human
endeavor—are far from optimal.
1. Attribution Theory and Intuitive Scientists
Early academic work done by Fritz Heider of the University of
Kansas121 and Albert Michotte at Louvain University in Belgium122
explored how people perceive causality and make attributions of
causality. If a square moves toward a circle on a visual screen, contacts
it, and the circle then moves away, people perceive causality. Even
though all that has happened is that a series of lights turned on and off
on the screen, people naturally perceive that the square caused the circle
to move.123 They often even attribute intentionality to the geometric
118. Cheng & Novick, supra note 115, at 545.
119. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW xxxiv (2d ed. 1985).
120. Many foundational scholars in tort law have characterized the determination of causation
not as a metaphysical or deeply theoretical exercise, but as a practical process engaged in by lay
people using their common sense. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §
20.2 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 30, 41 (W. Page Keeton ed., 1984);
Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 952 (1923).
121. FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1958). See also
Fritz Heider & Marianne Simmel, An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior, 57 AM. J.
PSYCHOL. 243 (1944) (reporting a famous experiment). Heider is known as the founder of
attribution theory.
122. ALBERT MICHOTTE, THE PERCEPTION OF CAUSALITY (1963). See also KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, supra note 116, at 76 (“Michotte . . . argued that we see causality,
just as directly as we see color . . . . We are evidently ready from birth to have impressions of
causality, which do not depend on reasoning about patterns of causation. They are products of
System 1.”).
123. This point was brought home to me in the summer of 2012 when I visited the
Exploratorium science museum in San Francisco. In its auditory illusions section, I watched a
screen with a square. Two red balls emerged from the upper left and upper right corners of the
screen, both moving diagonally. They met in the middle, making a little popping sound and then
bounced off each other. The ball that had emerged from the upper left hand corner exited through
the lower left hand corner. The ball that had emerged from the upper right hand corner exited
through the lower right hand corner. At least, that is what my mind perceived. Obviously, the
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shapes—the square meant to hit the circle and cause it to move away.124
Building on the work of Michotte and Heider, Kelley proposed that
people are “intuitive scientists,” drawing causal inferences based on the
principle of covariation.125
Over time, however, evidence has
established that people are not as scientifically intuitive as originators of
attribution theory had first posited.126
2. Factors Affecting Causal Thinking
Among multiple potential causes, what leads people to ascribe
causality to A rather than to B or C? As early as 1935, Koffka
two balls were just lights on a screen. They did not really make a popping sound when they
collided.
Indeed, when pursuant to a prompt on the screen I turned off the sound, the actual movement of
the balls, as I perceived it, changed. Now, it appeared that the ball that entered the screen from
the upper left hand corner proceeded right through the middle of the box and exited out the lower
right hand corner and the ball that entered from the upper right hand corner proceeded through the
middle of the box and exited out the lower left hand corner. Without the sound effect, my mind
perceived that the balls proceeded in a straight line through the box, briefly occupying the same
space in the very middle. But when a sound effect was introduced that my mind perceived as the
sound of the two balls bouncing off one another, my visual perception of the balls’ action
changed completely. The sound caused me to reach a completely different conclusion regarding
the movement of the balls. The demonstration is consistent with Danks’ point about System I’s
causal perception, where the keys are often spatio-temporal cues. Two things happening in
spatial proximity to one another are naturally more likely to be viewed as causally related than if
they are not close to one another. And if A follows B temporally, B is more likely to be viewed
as the cause of A than vice-versa. See Danks, supra note 116, at 457.
124. See id. at 449 (discussing the work of Michotte (especially this “launching effect”) and of
Heider and Simmel). See also KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, supra note 116, at 76
(“The perception of intention and emotion is irresistible; only people afflicted with autism do not
experience it. All this is entirely in your mind, of course. Your mind is ready and even eager to
identify agents, assign them personality traits and specific intentions, and view their actions as
expressing individual propensities. Here again, the evidence is that we are born prepared to make
intentional attributions: infants under one year old identify bullies and victims, and expect a
pursuer to follow the most direct path in attempting to catch whatever it is chasing.”); Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw, The Financial Crisis of 2008-2009: Capitalism Didn’t Fail, but the Metaphors Got a
“C,” 95 MINN. L. REV. 1532, 1538 (2011) (noting that the “language of causation reveals a
human proclivity to import purposiveness and intentionality into causation” (citing STEVEN
PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE 153–63
(2007))).
125. Harold H. Kelley & John L. Michela, Attribution Theory and Research, 31 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 457 (1980); Harold H. Kelley, Attribution in Social Psychology, in 15 NEB. SYMP. ON
MOTIVATION 192, 194 (D. Levine ed., 1967) (announcing the co-variation ANOVA model that
the “effect is attributed to that condition which is present when the effect is present and which is
absent when the effect is absent”).
126. Even regarding our own actions, we often do not understand the causes of what we do,
frequently mistaking correlation for causation. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot:
Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 230 (2005). The
label “intuitive scientist” has stuck, however, and is now generally used to describe how ordinary
people make causal and other decisions. Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary
Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771–72 (2000).
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discovered that people are likely to ascribe unwarranted causality to
some stimuli just because they are more salient than others.127 This is
sometimes called the illusion of causation128 (or illusory causation),
caused largely by the fact that people’s literal point of view affects how
they initially register or extract information from an observed
interaction, which in turn affects judgments regarding causal
influence.129 This phenomenon has been manifested in legal settings,
where, for example, studies show that if a camera is focused more on a
criminal suspect who is confessing, mock jurors are twice as likely to
convict the suspect as they are if the camera is focused upon the person
asking the questions to the suspect.130 The effect influences experts,
like judges and law enforcement officers, as well as laypeople.131
Numerous other studies have shed light on causal thinking. For
example, what causes people to help others? People tend to perceive
that something “inside” high-status people causes them to help others,
whereas external forces such as social pressure account for low-status
people offering similar help.132 What causes people to do bad things?
127. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 91–96 (2012) (explaining how salience
or lack thereof causes people to act irrationally in entering into contracts). See also Jon Hanson &
David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 137 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situation] (“[T]he mind tends to downplay the role of complexifying context and
overplay the role of salient behavior.”); Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and
Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1566 (2004) (noting that a problem with
counterfactual thinking is people’s tendency to overweigh “vivid, anecdotal evidence relative to
drab, statistical, or actuarial data”); Susan E. Taylor & Shelley T. Fiske, Point of View and
Perceptions of Causality, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 439 (1975) (finding that salience
is important in causation attributions, as people are likely to attribute an effect to the cause that is
most salient in the perceptual field when the effect is observed); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically
Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (2011) (“Attention is a scarce resource, and
vivid, salient, and novel presentations may trigger attention in ways that abstract or familiar ones
cannot.”).
128. Daniel.T. Gilbert, Attribution and Interpersonal Perception, in ADVANCED SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 99 (Abraham Tesser ed., 1995); Leslie Zebrowitz McArthur, Illusory Causation
and Illusory Correlation: Two Epistemological Accounts, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 507, 517 (1980).
129. G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Illusory Causation: Why It Occurs, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 299, 304
(2002).
130. G. Daniel Lassiter, Illusory Causation in the Courtroom, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOL. SCI. 204, 206 (2002). See also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 127, at
333 (“[P]eople systematically—and often quite erroneously—attribute causation, responsibility,
and blame to the most visible actors in a given situation. They compound their mistakes through
the fundamental attribution error, by assuming that action is attributable to disposition, rather than
situation.”).
131. G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 225
(2006).
132. John W. Thibaut & Henry W. Riecken, Some Determinants and Consequences of the
Perception of Social Causality, 24 J. PERSONALITY 113 (1955).
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Pursuant to the fundamental attribution error, people tend to perceive
that, among other things, bad character causes other people to do bad
things, but believe that they themselves do bad things because of
situational factors (such as pressure from their superiors).133 This is
part of an overall tendency people have to underestimate the influence
of the situations that other people find themselves in and to overestimate
the influence of other people’s individual characteristics.134 Adequately
133. See BRUCE HOOD, THE SELF ILLUSION, at xvii (2012) (explaining the fundamental
attribution error in rather colloquial terms: “When other people screw up, it’s because they are
stupid or losers, but when I screw up it’s because of my circumstances”); LEE ROSS & RICHARD
E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 53 (1991) (“The tendency to make unwarranted
leaps from acts to corresponding dispositions is perhaps the most fundamental and most common
failing of social inference.”); PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 93 (1991) (“[H]uman behavior is much more under
the influence of situational variables than we usually recognize or are willing to admit.”); Neal R.
Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation,
Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 128 (1995) [hereinafter Feigenson,
Rhetoric of Torts] (“The fundamental attribution error reflects both the availability and
representativeness heuristics. It derives from the availability heuristic because, in social settings,
actors tend to appear more salient, and hence are more available, than situational elements, and
are thus more likely to be seen as causal agents. It also derives from overreliance on the
representativeness heuristic because it treats behavior as representative of a dispositional state it
resembles.”); Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the
Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 291 (2012) (“[B]ad moral character prompts an
inference to a desired conclusion, namely, increased blame. Judgments about greater causal
influence and intent are also increased to justify the blame conclusion, which is likely to follow
quickly and intuitively from the information about the severity of the harm and the moral
character of the actor.”); Serge Moscovici & Miles Hewstone, Social Representations and Social
Explanations: From the “Naive” to the “Amateur” Scientist, in ATTRIBUTION THEORY: SOCIAL
AND FUNCTIONAL EXTENSIONS 98, 120 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983) [hereinafter ATTRIBUTION
THEORY] (explaining that, because of the fundamental attribution error, “situational information
is apparently ignored or poorly judged”); Philip E. Tetlock, An Alternative Metaphor in the Study
of Judgment and Choice: People as Politicians, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES 657, 669 (William M. Goldstein &
Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997).
134. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 106 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson &
Yosifon, Situational Character] (making the case for “situationism” over “dispositionism”) It is
nearly impossible to read all the evidence assembled by Hanson and Yosifon in this article and
not agree with the view that what they call “situationism” is extremely pervasive in human
decision making and is also greatly underestimated (in favor of what they call “dispositionism”)
by decision makers. However, it is true that there are some studies that indicate qualifications to
that view (which Hanson and Yosifon recognize). See also Susan M. Davies, Evidence of
Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 524 (1991)
(“The studies of interpersonal perception relied upon to demonstrate that lay persons, including
jurors and character witnesses, make erroneous predictions about behavior because they are
unable to perceive and assess accurately the character traits of others, have been cast into doubt
by criticisms of the experimental methodology employed, and by recent studies indicating
significant accuracy in assessments of personality by lay observers.” (footnotes omitted)); David
C. Funder, Errors and Mistakes: Evaluating the Accuracy of Social Judgment, 101 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 75, 76 (1987) (arguing that research on attribution error is almost completely irrelevant to
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accounting for situational pressures, although seldom done, “is a
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for making accurate causal
attributions.”135
What other tendencies do people have that might skew causality
attributions? People tend to ascribe causality to the actions of humans
rather than other factors.136 Part of the reason may relate to the salience
factor mentioned above—background situational factors are typically
perceived as pallid next to the more dynamic actions of a human
being.137
Due to an action bias, people attribute more causality to people’s
actions than to inactions with similar effects.138

the accuracy of social judgment in daily life); Fiona Lee & Mark Hallahan, Do Situational
Expectations Produce Situational Inferences? The Role of Future Expectations in Directing
Inferential Goals, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 545, 554 (2001) (finding that
“situational expectations led observers to make more situational inferences than dispositional
inferences”); Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 738 (1998)
(“[R]ecent [fundamental attribution error] studies seem to be more favorable to lay reasoning than
those studies relied upon by legal scholars in the 1970s and 80s.”).
135. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Attributions and Ideologies: Two Divergent Visions of
Human Behavior Behind Our Laws, Policies, and Theories, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND
LAW 298, 300 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012) [hereinafter IDEOLOGY].
136. REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 29 (2001); HEIDER, supra note 121, at 96
(arguing that one flaw in people’s causal attribution is that “under certain conditions there is a
tendency to attribute the outcome of an action to the person even though its source may reside in
the environment”); Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 126 (“Social psychological
research strongly suggests that jurors are prone to assume that if an accident has occurred,
someone deserves blame for it, and to allocate that blame based on the sorts of people they
perceive the parties to be.”); Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1345, 1370 (2008) (“Our proclivity to attribute human actions to the dispositions of the
person and not the situation is the most basic of attributional biases (which is not to say that it is
without exceptions).”); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 127, at 174 (“[H]uman
actions dominate the field in our causal attributions—we see what is most obvious and salient,
and tend to miss the rest.”).
137. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 67 (2d ed. 1991)
(“Background factors, social context, roles, or situational pressures that may have given rise to
the behavior are . . . relatively pallid and dull and unlikely to be noticed in comparison to the
dynamic behavior of the actor.”).
138. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM., Jan. 1982,
at 160, 173. A scenario conceived by Kahneman and Tversky illustrates this phenomenon, also
called the omission bias. Assume that Stockbroker A switches his client’s portfolio from ABC
stock to XYZ stock, and that Stockbroker B considers switching his client’s portfolio from XYZ
stock to ABC stock but decides not to do so. Then assume that ABC stock rises in value and that
the XYZ stock price plummets. Both Stockbroker A’s decision to act and Stockbroker B’s
decision not to act had the same adverse effect on their clients, but studies show that jurors will
find a stronger causal connection between the bad outcome and Stockbroker A’s action than
Stockbroker B’s inaction. Jurors will also tend to blame Stockbroker A more and award
Stockbroker A’s clients greater damages. For more detail on the strong distinction people draw
between action and inaction, see Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission
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People like stories and often conceive of lawsuits as melodramas
where they may tend to look for a “bad guy” to blame, especially if they
can view other actors as plausibly innocent.139
The theory of culpable causation indicates that the more culpable a
person’s act, the more people will tend to view it as a cause of
subsequent events,140 even though there is no necessary logical
Bias, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475 (1994). See also Johanna
H. Kordes-de Vaal, Intention and the Omission Bias: Omissions Perceived as Nondecision, 93
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 161, 169 (1996) (noting the “reduced strength of the perceived causal link
between an omission and its consequences” when compared to an action and its consequences);
Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 583, 590–94, 612 (2003) (“[A]ttribution theory posits that the heightened
negative emotions people experience for bad outcomes, which are associated with actions and
abnormalities, is due to the fact that there is a tighter perceived causal connection between actions
and outcomes than between omissions and outcomes.”).
139. Neal R. Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 752
(1999/2000) [hereinafter Feigenson, Melodrama]. According to Feigenson,
people tend to prefer simple explanations for events or behaviors to complex ones. A
century and a half ago, John Stuart Mill identified “the prejudice that a phenomenon
cannot have more than one cause.” We tend to be “satisficers,” content to rely on what
first strikes us as a plausible sufficient cause for an event, guided consciously by
simple schemas for “how things go” or unconsciously by the mere availability of
causal candidates. And even though people can sometimes generate multiple possible
causes of their own or others’ behavior, they tend to act as if causation were
“hydraulic,” such that the presence of one sufficient causal factor reduces the tendency
to attribute causal force to any other factor.
Id. (citations omitted). An example is the story of the Exxon Valdez accident, where there were
numerous causes, but where most people focused upon the intoxication of the ship’s captain,
Joseph Hazelwood. See STEVE COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: EXXONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER
6–7 (2012).
140. Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 370
(1992) (“With causal necessity, sufficiency, and proximity held constant, the more culpable act
was deemed by subjects to have exerted a larger causal influence.”); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable
Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 558 (2000) [hereinafter Alicke,
Culpable Control] (“[P]eople are socialized to predicate blame on criteria such as intention,
causation, and foresight.”); Neal R. Feigenson, On Social Cognition and Persuasive Writing, 20
LEGAL STUD. F. 75, 77–78 (1996) [hereinafter Feigenson, On Social Cognition] (explaining how
culpable causation works); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental
Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 274–78
(1990) (finding in a simulated trial that mock jurors who heard evidence regarding bad conduct,
causation, and damages found causation in 87.5% of cases, whereas jurors who heard only
causation evidence found causation only 20% of the time); Levinson & Peng, supra note 10, at
214–15 (“Moral judgments are inextricably linked to causal determinations.”); Richard A.
Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121,
1168 (1998) (“Experimental research by cognitive psychologists indicates that mock juries tend
to return more verdicts for plaintiffs when they consider close questions of scientific causation
together with evidence of the defendant’s fault, as compared to consideration of the causation
issue alone.”); Lawrence M. Solan, Where Does Blaming Come From?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 939,
943 (2005) [hereinafter Solan, Where Does Blaming] (“[O]ur attribution in any particular
situation may well be influenced by considerations including the prior assignment of blame.”);
Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An
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connection between culpability and causation,141 and the legal
definition of causation does not connect it to state of mind.142
Because of the severity effect, the more serious the injuries, the
higher the levels of both causation and fault jurors are likely to find,143
even though there is also no necessary connection between the severity
of an injury and its cause.144
Causal reasoning “is clearly influenced by prior beliefs.”145 If people
hold racist beliefs and a bad thing happens with both a black man and a
white man available as potential perpetrators of the causal act, those
people are more likely to believe that the black man’s actions caused the
bad thing than the white man’s. Causal inferences people draw are
significantly affected by the categories and concepts that their minds
have already developed, even when those categories “are suboptimal for
causal learning.”146
People tend to perceive that which they expect to perceive.147
Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 291 (2001) (“The more the enabler’s state of
mind approached intentionality, the greater the contribution he was seen as making to the
accident.”).
141. For example, when Driver X is involved in an auto accident, his role in causation is
typically unaffected by the purpose of his trip. Whether he was driving somewhere to buy bread,
to buy a basketball, or to buy drugs, his running of a stop sign, for example, has the same causal
connection to the accident.
142. Martha Chamallas, Warm Reasoning and Legal Proof of Discrimination, in IDEOLOGY,
supra note 135, at 380, 381 (“The legal definition of causation . . . has not been tied to state of
mind . . .”).
143. Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 147–48 (citing Elaine Walster,
Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 77
(1966)); D. Chimaeze Ugwuegbu & Clyde Hendrick, Personal Causality and Attribution of
Responsibility, 2 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 76, 84 (1974) (finding that more severe harm
translates into a jury finding more causality on defendant’s part).
144. Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 147.
145. Danks, supra note 116, at 455. See also Brian H. Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, ExtraLegal Factors and Product Liability: The Influence of Mock Jurors’ Demographic
Characteristics and Intuitions about the Cause of an Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 127 (1994)
(noting that people tend to give more causal weight to actions that are consistent with their preexisting schemas regarding what typically causes a particular event); Sara Gordon, Through the
Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Cognitive Psychology in the Application of ‘Plain Language’ Jury
Instructions, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2133000 (noting that people “tend to notice information that fits into existing
schemas and ignore that which does not”).
146. Danks, supra note 116, at 455 (citing Michael R. Waldmann & York Hagmayer,
Categories and Causality: The Neglected Direction, 53 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 27 (2006)). In
criminal cases, for example, jurors tend to judge guilt or innocence based on how well the
evidence corresponds to their preexisting conception of the offense, rather than how the offense is
defined in the judge’s instructions to the jury. Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at
94–95 (citing Vicki Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts,
61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 858 (1991)).
147. Darren Newtson, Foundations of Attribution: The Perception of Ongoing Behavior, in I
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Relatedly, they will tend to fit the facts to their theories as much as or
more than they will fit their theories to the facts.148 While engaging in
causal reasoning, people will even “tend to remember information that
is consistent with established schemas and have more difficulty
recalling that which is not.”149
Through motivated reasoning, people generally judge evidence of
causal theories in a self-serving manner.150
People tend to prefer simple, even single explanations of causation
(monocausality) to complex explanations.151
Via the primacy effect, people often tend to attribute greater influence
to information acquired earlier in a sequence than information acquired
later.152
NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 223, 241–45 (John H. Harvey et al. eds., 1976).
148. Solan, Cognitive Foundations, supra note 99, at 1026 (“People tend to maximize the
evidence that supports reaching conclusions they believe to be fair, and to minimize the evidence
that supports conclusions that they believe not to be fair.”).
149. Gordon, supra note 145, at 78.
150. Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal
Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 636 (1987). This self-serving bias accounts for
what some have called the defensive attribution hypothesis, which is that victims of occupational
accidents ascribe causation to external factors while their coworkers and superiors point to the
victims’ own actions as causative. See Sino Salminen, Defensive Attribution Hypothesis and
Serious Occupational Accidents, 70 PSYCHOL. RPTS. 1195 (1992). Shaver theorizes that both
victims and eyewitnesses tend to explain the causes of accidents so that their own personal
responsibility is minimized rather than so that the true cause is discovered. Kelly G. Shaver,
Defensive Attribution: Effects of Severity and Relevance on the Responsibility Assigned for an
Accident, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1970). See also JONATHAN BARON,
THINKING AND DECIDING 195 (3d ed. 2000) (“People tend not to look for evidence against what
they favor, and, when they find it anyway, they tend to ignore it.”); Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17–19 (2008)
(arguing that three theories—Culpable Control Theory, Identity-Protective Cognition, and
Cultural Cognition of Risk—cause people to subconsciously bend the facts to fit self-serving
views and therefore make it difficult for people to make objective judgments of causation and
other matters); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
2098, 2099 (1979); Mitchell, supra note 127, at 1563–64 (“[F]rom a psychological perspective, a
particular concern with thought experiments [such as those that occur during counterfactual
thinking] is the potential biasing influence of preexisting theories, values, and beliefs; what one
hopes to find may strongly influence what one ultimately finds.”).
151. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 134, at 106 (“[W]e prefer
simple explanations, those that can explain the most with as little complexity as possible.”). See
also RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 114–15, 119, 129–30 (1980) (“[T]he intuitive scientist is prone to several
major sources of error in causal analysis, including . . . use of simplistic and ‘overly
parsimonious’ criteria for causal attribution.”). One of the most common simplifying strategies is
to eliminate situational factors from the calculation and attribute causation to an actor’s character
alone. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Backlash: The Reaction to Mind Sciences in Legal
Academia, in IDEOLOGY, supra note 135, at 501, 506.
152. See, e.g., Joel T. Johnson et al., Causal Primacy and Comparative Fault: The Effect of
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Framing, which is “an effect of the description, labeling, or
presentation of a problem on responses to it,”153 can affect people’s
thinking about situations on a number of dimensions, including
causation.154
People’s causal reasoning is subject to content effects in that the
subject matter of the task affects reasoning performance.155
People tend to be rather poor at statistical reasoning,156 which has
obvious implications for their ability to accurately determine causality
in a number of settings.157 Among other things, people tend to
Position in a Causal Chain on Judgments of Legal Responsibility, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 161 (1989); Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social
Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 880 (1975); Amiram Vinokur & Icek Ajzen, Relative Importance of Prior and
Immediate Events: A Causal Primacy Effect, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 820 (1982).
However, this is not a reliable phenomenon in all circumstances. In some cases, later acquired
information seems to have more impact in causal assignments. See, e.g., Ahogni N’gbala & Nyla
R. Branscombe, Mental Simulation and Causal Attribution: When Simulating an Event Does Not
Affect Fault Assignment, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 139 (1995); Barbara A. Spellman,
Crediting Causality, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 323 (1997) (finding a minimal
impact arising from temporal order).
153. ANDREW M. COLMAN, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 295 (3d ed. 2009). Framing
was, of course, first studied in detail by Kahneman and Tversky. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984) (“The same
option, however, can be framed or described in different ways.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453
(1981) (“[T]he decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated
with a particular choice” constitute a decision frame). Because of framing, people think a
hamburger labeled “75 percent lean” tastes better than an identical hamburger that is labeled “25
percent fat.” WRAY HERBERT, ON SECOND THOUGHT: OUTSMARTING YOUR MIND’S HARDWIRED HABITS 94 (2010).
154. See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1645, 1668 (2004) (“The ways in which we construe our world and make attributions of
causation, responsibility, and blame depend largely upon who presents the information,
narratives, and images to us and how.”); Lipshaw, supra note 124, at 1549–50 (noting that
causation is very complex).
155. See Denise D. Cummins et al., Conditional Reasoning and Causation, 19 MEMORY &
COGNITION 274, 274 (1991) (“Reasoning problems with identical formal properties but different
subjective contents often produce different levels of performance.”). But see Cheng & Novick,
supra note 115, at 561 (proposing an alternative explanation).
156. See J. St. B.T. Evans, Bias and Rationality, in RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 6, 24–25 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (observing
that although people were formerly regarded as good intuitive statistical reasoners, over the past
two decades “evidence has accumulated that the way in which subjective probabilities are formed
is apparently subject to a wide variety of biases”); KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW,
supra note 116, at 77 (“Unfortunately, System 1 does not have the capability for [the statistical]
mode of reasoning; System 2 can learn to think statistically, but few people receive the necessary
training.”).
157. In the same vein is the iconic Kahneman study of air force flight instruction in Israel,
where researchers found that when pilots were strongly criticized after a weak performance, they
tended to improve thereafter, whereas when pilots were praised after a strong performance, they
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underestimate disjunctive probabilities and overestimate conjunctive
probabilities.158
Put all this together and it is clear that people are not exactly
paragons of rationality when making determinations of causality. While
we begin thinking about causality as babies and obviously must have a
certain level of competence in drawing causal connections in order to
survive in the world, the evidence from behavioral psychologists over
the years clearly “illuminates the complexities of relying upon a judge
or jury to fulfill our law’s request to use ‘common sense’ when making
judgments about causation.”159 As Daniel Kahneman has written,
“System 1 is highly adept in one form of thinking—it automatically and
effortlessly identifies causal connections between events, sometimes
even when the connection is spurious.”160 System 2 also has a raft of
shortcomings, including that people’s “overall capacity for mental effort
is limited”161 and their probabilistic reasoning is often defective.162 The
impact of these deficiencies is exacerbated by overconfidence. Humans
tend toward overconfidence in a wide variety of human endeavors,163 so
it is not surprising that people tend to believe their “causal attributions
tended to do worse thereafter. While an initial conclusion was that criticism caused improvement
and praise caused decline, what was occurring was simply regression to the mean. Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 99, at 67–68.
158. That is, they underestimate “A or B” probabilities, but overestimate “A and B”
probabilities. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of
Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 631 (citing Gordon F. Pitz,
Sensitivity of Direct and Derived Judgments to Probabilistic Information, 65 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 164 (1980)); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional versus Intuitive
Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 293
(1983) (noting that people often misjudge conjunctive probabilities).
159. Levinson & Peng, supra note 10, at 207.
160. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, supra note 116, at 110 (emphasis added). See
also HOOD, supra note 133, at 139–40 (“We naturally see the world in terms of causes and
consequences, so when something happens, we assume that some causal event preceded it and
start looking around for suitable candidates. The problem is that we often identify causes that are
not responsible.” (emphasis added)).
161. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003).
162. Daniel Young, Note, Curing What Ails Us: How the Lessons of Behavioral Economics
Can Improve Health Care Markets, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 469 (2012) (citing sources
for the proposition that “people are terrible decision makers when it comes to [probabilistic]
calculations”).
163. See MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 95 (4th ed. 1998)
(“People have been found to perceive themselves as being better than others across a number of
traits, including honesty, cooperativeness, rationality, driving skill, health, and intelligence.”);
DAVID BROOKS, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 218 (2011) (noting that people’s minds are
“overconfidence machine[s]”); Hillel J. Einhorn, Overconfidence in Judgment, in 4 NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 1 (1980).
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to be, more or less, spot on.”164
3. Counterfactual Reasoning
To delve more deeply into the processes of human causal reasoning,
it is clear that much causal reasoning in the legal realm (and most
others) is counterfactual reasoning.165 Counterfactual thinking occurs
when people imagine states of the world that might have happened but
did not.166 In other words, people ask: “If A had not occurred, would B
have not occurred?”167 To place the matter in a securities context, they
might ask: “If ABC Company had not issued false financial statements,
would Investor X have avoided losing $40,000 when ABC’s stock price
later dropped from $50 per share to $30 per share?”168
It is clear that “judgments of causality are often driven by not only
what actually happened, but also what almost happened or what
normally happens.”169 When people engage in counterfactual thinking
to determine the cause of an accident, they imagine scenarios other than
the one that actually occurred by mutating (undoing) one or more of the
actions or events that preceded the outcome. In a car accident case, they
might imagine what would have happened if Driver A had not exceeded
the speed limit or if Driver B had not run the stop sign.
164. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Seeing Bias: Discrediting and Dismissing Accurate
Attributions, in IDEOLOGY, supra note 135, at 453, 454.
165. See Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 116 (“Research indicates that the
analysis of causation is always implicitly, if not explicitly, counterfactual. All leading models of
causal attribution give answers to variations on the question: Why did this event occur rather than
that? And because explanations ordinarily are sought only when what happens is contrary to
expectations or to the normal state of affairs, causal analysis can be understood to answer the
question: Why did this event occur rather than the normal one? Thus, the question of causation in
the accident case involves a comparison between what actually happened and a contrasting,
‘normal’ case in which the result to be explained—the accident—did not occur.”). See also
Marlys Gascho Lipe, Counterfactual Reasoning as a Framework for Attribution Theories, 109
PSYCHOL. BULL. 456 (1991) (arguing that social psychological causal attribution theories are all
based on counterfactual thinking).
166. See Vittorio Girotto et al., Event Controllability in Counterfactual Thinking, 78 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 111, 112 (1991) (providing that counterfactual thinking is “the mental
construction of alternatives to factual events”).
167. See generally David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556 (1973) (citing DAVID HUME, AN
ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, § VII (1748)) (drawing upon Hume’s
statement that causation exists “where, if the first object had not been, the second never had
existed”).
168. Sheila Foster’s article on counterfactual (and contrastive) reasoning in employment
discrimination cases, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent versus Impact, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1469 (2005), has significantly influenced my thinking on how to organize this
Article.
169. Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals as Behavioral Primes:
Priming the Simulation Heuristic and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 384, 385 (2000).
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The easier it is to imagine a particular change in the events preceding
the outcome, the more probable [people] judge that alternative, and the
more likely they are to think that the actual outcome need not have
occurred. The cause of the actual event becomes the prior occurrence
that is changed in the alternative story.170

Like most every other kind of human thinking, counterfactual
thinking is “shaped by various influences—normative expectations and
cognitive biases, for example—that critically shape [it] and can have a
determinative role on causal attributions.”171 The weaknesses in causal
thinking noted in the previous Subsection are naturally manifested when
that causal thinking takes the form of counterfactual thinking. For
example, studies have demonstrated that the tendency to focus on the
salient, to see what we expect to see, and to fall victim to the
fundamental attribution error are all part of counterfactual thinking.172
And the amount of blame mock jurors assign to a particular party,
studies show, can largely depend on whether the jurors are encouraged
to generate counterfactuals involving that party.173
How do people decide which events to mutate when they engage in
counterfactual thinking? Naturally, Daniel Kahneman has had a lot to
say about counterfactual reasoning, particularly regarding the
simulation heuristic and norm theory. The simulation heuristic174
derives from a famous Kahneman and Tversky study in which different
groups of subjects read descriptions of a car wreck.175 In one scenario,
170. Feigenson, Melodrama, supra note 139, at 754–55 (footnote omitted). See generally
Foster, supra note 168, at 1481–84 (providing a clear explanation of counterfactual thinking).
171. Foster, supra note 168, at 1476. “[C]ausal judgments are affected by the knowledge,
biases, and motivations that individuals bring to the process. Although much of the way that
individuals reason about causal judgments in everyday life is automatic, causal judgments are
vulnerable to unconscious and deeply entrenched cognitive biases.” Id. at 1478. The same is true
of “contrastive” reasoning, which “compare[s] the occurrence with similar occurrences as a way
to identify possible explanatory factors.” Id. at 1475–76.
172. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 134, at 68–69 (“Our
counterfactual patterns of thought are related to the same basic internal situation that drives the
fundamental attribution error. For instance, both reflect the more general tendency to focus on
what is easy to see and on what we expect to see. Moreover, counterfactual imaginings reflect
and further entrench the situational character’s dispositionism.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
173. See Nyla R. Branscombe et al., Rape and Accident Counterfactuals: Who Might Have
Done Otherwise and Would It Have Changed the Outcome?, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1042,
1061–64 (1996) (finding that by presenting a counterfactual focusing on the other party’s client,
lawyers can lower the blame placed on their own client).
174. See Feigenson, On Social Cognition, supra note 140, at 76 (“Using the simulation
heuristic, people who must identify the cause(s) of some outcome construct scenarios other than
the one that actually occurred by ‘undoing’ one or more of the events that preceded the
outcome.”).
175. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 99, at 201–08.
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the victim of the wreck left work at the usual time but took an unusual
route home. In the other scenario, the victim left work at an unusual
time (earlier than usual) but took the usual route home. In both cases, a
teenager driving a truck while under the influence of drugs rammed the
victim. In the case involving the usual time but unusual route, subjects
were more likely to mutate the choice of route (“If only he had taken his
normal path home, he would still be alive today.”), whereas in the case
of the unusual time, jurors were more likely to imagine changing that
factor (“If only he had not left early, the accident needn’t have
happened”). The bottom line is that actions that depart from the norm
are more likely to be mutated and therefore more likely to be viewed as
important causal factors than normal actions.176
Kahneman and Miller177 proposed in their article on norm theory that
people have a tendency to associate greater responsibility with abnormal
actions, in part because they are more likely to manipulate or mutate an
unusual event than a normal event, and therefore to assign it more
causation. It is simply easier to imagine doing the normal thing
(thereby avoiding the harm that occurred).178 “Causal questions about
particular events are generally raised only when these events are
abnormal.”179 Kahneman and Miller also emphasized “that norms are
computed after the event rather than in advance.”180
A cause must be an event that could easily have been otherwise. In
particular, a cause cannot be a default value among the elements that the
event produced. Hart and Honoré—who observed that the statement,
“It was the presence of oxygen that caused the fire,” makes sense only if
there were reasons to view the presence of oxygen as abnormal—noted
the rule that a default value cannot be presented as a cause.181
Several years ago, Jay Koehler and I reported the results of an
experiment indicating that there is such a significant bias in favor of a
normal state (the normality bias) that its effects swamp those of the

176. If mentally undoing an action produces an imagined outcome that is different from what
actually occurred, then people will tend to perceive the action as a causal agent. See Gary L.
Wells & Igor Gavanski, Mental Simulation of Causality, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
161, 161 (1989).
177. Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its
Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136 (1986).
178. Id. at 144–45. See generally Foster, supra note 168, at 1481–84 (providing a basic
explanation of the role of norm theory in counterfactual thinking).
179. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 177, at 148.
180. Id. at 136.
181. Id. at 149 (citing H. L. A. HART & ANTHONY HONORÉ, A.M., CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(1959)).
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action/inaction distinction (the tendency, mentioned above,182 to find
more causality stemming from actions than from inactions).183 We also
explained how the normality bias is supported by a raft of welldocumented psychological phenomena that were discovered by
Kahneman, Tversky, and others inspired by their research agenda,
including the status quo bias,184 the endowment effect,185 loss
aversion,186 anchoring,187 the sunk cost effect,188 and regret aversion
theory.
Regret aversion theory is the notion that people anticipate unpleasant
emotions, such as regret, and even these anticipated emotions affect

182. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
183. Prentice & Koehler, supra note 138, at 591–94.
184. According to the status quo bias, all other things equal, people will tend to prefer what
they perceive to be the current state of affairs to other possible states of affairs. See Brigitte C.
Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings
Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149, 1176–77 (2001) (observing that people are slower to convert to
new savings plans than they would be if they were automatically enrolled); William Samuelson &
Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988)
(“[D]ecision makers often stick with the status quo alternative, for example, to follow customary
company policy, to elect an incumbent to still another term in office, to purchase the same
product brands, or to stay in the same job.”).
185. Because of the endowment effect, the perceived value of an item increases when it
becomes part of an individual’s endowment and that individual begins to think of the item as his
or her own. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and
Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
186. Loss aversion describes the notion that people’s value function for losses tends to be
steeper than their value function for gains. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE:
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63–78 (1992); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193,
199–203 (Winter 1991).
187. Pursuant to the anchoring heuristic, decision makers tend to estimate quantities by
anchoring on a convenient value, and then adjusting for case-specific information, although
typically not to a sufficient degree. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More
You Ask For, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 519, 519 (1996) (“Anchoring and adjustment is a bias in which individuals’ numerical
judgments are inordinately influenced by an arbitrary or irrelevant number.” (citation omitted)).
See also MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE 23 (2011) (noting that people tend to adjust
numbers based on other numbers they have used as “anchors”); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128
(1974) (“[D]ifferent starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial
values. We call this phenomenon anchoring.”).
188. A sunk cost is one that was previously incurred and will not be affected by any future
decision. Rational people should ignore sunk costs, but many people often do not. See ROBYN
M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 22–24 (1988) (discussing and giving
examples of sunk costs). See also Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
903, 919 (2002) (reporting on a Second Circuit case where the court rejected the argument that
people look only at the short-term costs of decisions).
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their decision making.189 It emphasizes the role of emotions in
counterfactual reasoning, another key point of Kahneman and Miller’s
norm theory.190 Numerous subsequent studies have provided evidence
supporting the view that what is perceived as normal has a big impact
on what people mutate during counterfactual reasoning and therefore
upon what they perceive to be causal.191
When both human actions and environmental events are involved,
people engaged in counterfactual thinking are more likely to focus on
the human actions as the cause, both because it is easier to imagine
rectifying those actions and because they are more likely to be the
abnormal feature in a situation.192 Consistent with this psychological
evidence, Hart and Honoré’s analysis of case law found that, in
identifying causes, people tend to recognize either a voluntary human
189. See Richard P. Larrick, Motivational Factors in Decision Theories: The Role of SelfProtection, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 440, 445 (1993) (discussing the role of anticipated emotions on
decision making); Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in Decisions with
Feedback: A Negotiation Example, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
87 (1995) (similar). See also Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Counterfactual Thinking and
Victim Compensation: A Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 513,
516 (1986) (finding that “victims whose negative fates follow abnormal actions receive more
sympathy than victims whose negative fates follow normal actions”).
190. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 177, at 145 (“[T]he affective response to an event is
enhanced if its causes are abnormal.”).
191. See, e.g., Denis J. Hilton & Ben R. Slugoski, Knowledge-Based Causal Attribution: The
Abnormal Conditions Focus Model, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 75, 87 (1986) (finding that variations in
causal attribution can be predicted by looking at normal and abnormal conditions); C. Gustav
Lundberg & Dean Elliott Frost, Counterfactuals in Financial Decision Making, 79 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 227, 233 (1992) (noting that “an unanticipated event is more likely to be undone
by altering exceptional rather than routine aspects of the causal chain”); C. Neil Macrae et al.,
Counterfactual Thinking and the Perception of Criminal Behaviour, 84 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 221,
224–25 (1993) (reporting study where mock jurors awarded higher compensation to robber’s
victims when told that the robbery occurred when the subject took a new route home); Barbara A.
Spellman & David R. Mandel, When Possibility Informs Reality: Counterfactual Thinking as a
Cue to Causality, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 120, 121 (1999) (observing that bad
outcomes and abnormal events are most frequent triggers of counterfactual musings); Kandi Jo
Turley et al., Counterfactual Thinking and Perceptions of Rape, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 285, 289–90 (1995) (finding that when a victim is raped while taking an unusual route
home, mock jurors impose greater punishment on rapist than when victim is raped while taking
normal way home); Gary L. Wells et al., The Undoing of Scenarios, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 421, 428 (1987) (finding evidence that “exceptional events are more psychologically
mutable than are normal events”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Counterfactual Thinking in Mock
Juror Assessments of Negligence: A Preliminary Investigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89, 91
(1994) (“Research in counterfactual thinking has shown that it is easier to mentally mutate
exceptional or unusual events . . . .”).
192. Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note 140, at 569 (“As Hart and Honoré suggested,
human agency is frequently the abnormal feature that differentiates present from usual
circumstances. In choosing between a drunk driver and weather conditions as causal candidates
for the car accident, therefore, the culpable control model assumes that observers will favor the
human act.”).
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action, or an abnormal factor, as the cause of an event.193 Thus, the
theory is borne out in empirical analysis of case decisions.
4. Contrastive Reasoning
Contrastive thinking may also be relevant to causal determinations in
securities law cases.194 The theory involves identifying causal
explanations by contrasting the target event with cases where the event
did not occur.195 Factors that appear in one event but not the other are
potential causes of the event. As Foster notes,
Researchers have shown that contrastive and counterfactual reasoning
“may correspond to different types of causal judgments.”
Counterfactual thinking involves assessing whether a factor is among
those that influence an occurrence, while contrastive thinking involves
identifying factors that distinguish an occurrence from contrasting
background factors.
In other words, contrastive reasoning is
employed when individuals are confronted with an explanationfocused question—“What caused Y?”—whereas counterfactual
reasoning is employed when individuals are confronted with
evaluative-focused questions—“Did X cause Y?” Counterfactual
reasoning, by focusing on instances in which a particular factor is
absent, thus emphasizes the necessity of that factor to the outcome.
This differs from contrastive reasoning, which focuses on instances in
which the effect is absent, and thereby emphasizes the sufficiency of
the factor.196

193. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 119, at 33. As Wright points out:
According to Hart and Honoré, the central notion in the common-sense concept of
causation is that the cause is the factor which “makes a difference” by interfering with,
intervening in, or otherwise changing the normal or reasonably expected course of
events. Thus, a contributing factor is treated as the cause rather than as a mere
condition if it was (1) a voluntary human intervention that was intended to produce the
consequence (for example, deliberately breaking a vase) or (2) an abnormal action,
event, or condition in the particular context (for example, a freak storm or driving at an
excessive speed).
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1745–46 (1985).
194. Foster has a lengthy and detailed explanation of contrastive reasoning from which this
Article borrows liberally. See Foster, supra note 168, at 1484–85. See also Tim De Mey & Erik
Weber, Explanation and Thought Experiments in History, 42 HIST. & THEORY 28, 29–30 (2003)
(explaining uses of contrastive thinking in history discipline).
195. Ann L. McGill & Jill G. Klein, Contrastive and Counterfactual Reasoning in Causal
Judgment, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 897, 897 (1993).
196. Foster, supra note 168, at 1485 (citations omitted). Another way to look at the
differences between counterfactual and contrastive reasoning is, as Foster explains:
[T]he difference between counterfactual reasoning (an evaluative exercise) and
contrastive reasoning (an explanatory exercise) is that the latter tends to focus on
finding any sufficient factor or characteristic that might explain disparate treatment or
outcomes, whereas the former tends to focus on the necessity of a particular causal
factor to the decision or outcome. Another way of stating the difference is that
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Thus, in a Rule 10b-5 case, during counterfactual reasoning, the
alleged causal factor (the defendants’ misstatement or omission) is
mutated and people ask: “Would the stock price have fallen if the
statement or omission had not been made?” In contrastive reasoning,
however, the outcome or effect is mutated and people ask: “What made
the difference between the stock price drop in defendants’ company’s
stock and the stock price performance of other companies whose stock
did not drop?”
For present purposes, it is important that “[c]ontrastive analysis is
particularly susceptible to distortion from differences in motivation,
cognitive biases, and faulty background knowledge.”197 Whether
people are involved in counterfactual or contrastive reasoning, they are
subject to that raft of heuristics and biases mentioned earlier (e.g.,
illusory causation, motivated reasoning, action bias, severity effect,
culpable causation, and fundamental attribution error).
5. Causation Stories
As noted
people enjoy stories that help them engage in
counterfactual, contrastive, and other forms of reasoning. They tend to
try to fit the facts presented—including facts relevant to causal
attributions—into various frameworks or schemas.199
In general, a causal schema is a conception of the manner in which
two or more causal factors interact in relation to a particular kind of
effect. A schema is derived from experience in observing cause and
effect relationships, from experiments in which deliberate control has
been exercised over causal factors, and from implicit and explicit
teaching about the causal structure of the world. It enables a person to
perform certain operations with limited information, and thereby to
reach certain conclusions or inferences as to causation.200
Narrative is the fundamental way that people “translate knowing into
earlier,198

evaluative causal mechanisms such as counterfactuals focus on instances in which the
causal candidate is absent (“Would the employee have been fired if she were not a
woman?”), whereas explanatory causal mechanisms consider instances in which the
effect is absent (“What differentiates the employee who was fired from employees who
were not fired?”).
Id. at 1517–18.
197. Id. at 1490.
198. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
199. “A ‘schema’ is a cognitive framework or concept that helps individuals organize and
interpret information.” Gordon, supra note 145, at 7 (footnote omitted).
200. Solan, Cognitive Foundations, supra note 99, at 1006. See also Kelley & Michela, supra
note 125, at 471 (“A causal schema is a description of the common person’s conception of how
two or more causes combine to produce a certain effect.”).
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telling.”201 The work of Pennington/Hastie202 and Feigenson203
emphasizes that storytelling is critical to how jurors understand
cases.204 Their work and that of others shows “that jurors typically
organize complex evidence into narrative form, and that their judgments
and the confidence with which they hold them depend on the ease with
which they can generate acceptable stories from the data.”205 In
securities cases, as in others, jurors tease out causation through stories.
Market actors themselves, such as brokers and investors, generally
create meaning about market-related events through the story mode.206
Simply put, “[p]eople like their world to make sense,”207 and stories
help them do that.
Feigenson argues that jurors look at cases as melodramas and tend to
make sense of the evidence by conceiving of accidents using
“monocausality, norm theory, culpable causation, and the fundamental
attribution error,”208 all phenomena mentioned above. In other words,
to simplify the story, jurors tend to look for a single cause.209 In
201. Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 7 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 5, 5 (1980).
202. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’
Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991 (2001); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the
Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXP.
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION. 521 (1988); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242
(1986).
203. See, e.g., Feigenson, Melodrama, supra note 139, at 741; Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts,
supra note 133, at 61.
204. See Gordon, supra note 145, at 5–7 (explaining how juries use schemas to make sense of
the evidence presented to them).
205. Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 96.
206. See Emre Tarim, Narrative as a Sensemaking Heuristic: Evidence from Individual
Investors and Their Brokers 1–2 (June 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2115215 (explaining that stock market investors and brokers base their
interpretations of the market on how they have conceptualize that market).
207. Benforado & Hanson, Attributions and Ideologies, supra note 135, at 302.
208. Feigenson, Melodrama, supra note 139, at 790.
209. See id. at 753. Perhaps the need to conserve scarce cognitive capacity is the cause of the
preference for a single cause and the tendency to “satisfice”—to stop looking for additional
causes once one plausible cause presents itself. Id. See also ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 169–94 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the general human tendency to overly simplify
causation); KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, supra note 116, at 114 (“[W]e are prone to
exaggerate the consistency and coherence of what we see.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1223 (1995) (“[V]ery few actions or decisions derive from
a single cause. Indeed, a belief in monocausality . . . represents a common source of error in
attributional judgment.”); Mitchell, supra note 127, at 1573 (“The methodological
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looking for that single cause, jurors (and others), consistent with
Kahneman and Miller’s norm theory, tend to look for abnormal actions
upon which to pin causality.210 Imposing a “good guy/bad guy”
structure upon a case’s facts, jurors often tend to believe that bad
actions are more causal than innocent actions, even though the
motivation behind an action is typically irrelevant to its causal
quotient.211 Relatedly, pursuant to the fundamental attribution error,
jurors, like others, will tend to assign a larger portion of the cause upon
a person whom they can blame for having bad character.212 Put all of
these factors together, and Feigenson argues that in negligence cases,
when jurors decide, they usually blame someone for the accident, and
when jurors conceive of accidents as melodrama, they implement a
particular, culturally significant way of blaming. By simplifying and
personalizing responsibility, melodrama in accident cases, as in
popular culture generally, tends to divert attention from the more
systemic causes of many unintended harms and thus to preserve the
status quo of corporate industrial society.213

These are powerful tendencies. We have a “psychological need and
desire . . . to connect causation to character and identity, to attribute
responsibility and blame, and to give meaning to our melodramas and
our lives.”214
C. Lessons Learned
Thus, the evidence indicates that no matter how people think about
causation—whether they engage in counterfactual thinking, contrastive
thinking, story-telling, or some combination thereof—they are intuitive
scientists rather than rational Chicago Man. And as these intuitive
scientists apply their common sense approach in assigning causality,
underdetermination problem [of counterfactual causal thinking] is exacerbated by what may be
called the thought experiment’s ‘bias against complexity’: the counterfactual thought experiment
seems best suited to examining simple and direct causal relationships (in which the independent
variable takes on only two values and has a main effect on the dependent variable), rather than
probabilistic, contingent, and complex causal relationships (in which the independent variable
may take on a range of values and may interact with other causal variables.”).
210. Feigenson, Melodrama, supra note 139, at 754–55 (discussing Kahneman and Tversky’s
experiment revealing people are more likely to find abnormal actions as the cause of an accident).
211. Id. at 758. The evidence for culpable causation—the tendency to find more causation
when an actor was acting culpably than innocently—traces, of course, to Mark Alicke’s studies,
cited supra, note 140. See also Levinson & Peng, supra note 10, at 216–18 (discussing culpable
causation in a cross-cultural context).
212. Feigenson, Melodrama, supra note 139, at 758–60.
213. Id. at 783–84.
214. Philip N. Meyer, Making the Narrative Move: Observations Based Upon Reading Gerry
Spence’s Closing Argument in The Estate of Karen Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Inc., 9 CLINICAL L.
REV. 229, 280 (2002).
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they tend to ascribe more causality to human actions than to background
factors, more to actions than to inactions, more to abnormal factors than
to normal factors, more to factors they expect to see than those that they
don’t, more to factors that fit their preconceived notions than those that
don’t, more to those that fit a self-interested explanation than those that
don’t, more to causes that are simple than those that are complex, and so
forth. Overall, the behavioral and cognitive literature does not give a
tremendous vote of confidence to human decision making in the causal
realm.
III. WHAT DOES THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE TELL US ABOUT THE
LOSS CAUSATION RULES OF SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 LITIGATION?
A. In Praise of a Stiff Loss Causation Requirement
So far we have seen that the loss causation requirement in Rule 10b-5
cases is demanding and that individuals’ causal reasoning is often
unreliable. One can make the case that because people are likely to
make mistakes in assessing causation, it is well that the law of securities
fraud requires that a high bar be surmounted to establish loss causation
in order to avoid erroneously imposing liability upon defendants.
Although the Supreme Court has never cited any behavioral psychology
literature in its section 10(b) decisions nor shown itself conversant with
this literature outside the area of punitive damages,215 the high bar for
causation that it set in Dura is consistent with a common sense worry
that psychological forces will cause jurors and judges to be too eager to
find causal links where none actually exist.
Feigenson points out that attorneys’ closing arguments on technical
issues, such as causation, often have little to do with actual causation
and other elements of the legal doctrines, such as negligence, that are at

215. The Court did demonstrate some familiarity with the self-serving bias in Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Grant Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008):
The Court is aware of a body of literature running parallel to anecdotal reports,
examining the predictability of punitive awards by conducting numerous “mock
juries,” where different “jurors” are confronted with the same hypothetical case. See,
e.g., C. Sunstein, R. Hastie, J. Payne, D. Schkade, & W. Viscusi, Punitive Damages:
How Juries Decide (2002); Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, Deliberating About
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139 (2000); Hastie, Schkade, &
Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s
Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 445 (1999); Sunstein,
Kahneman, & Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L.J. 2071 (1998). Because this research was funded in
part by [defendant] Exxon, we decline to rely on it.
Id. at 501 n.17 (emphasis added). See also Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S.
424, 432, 439 (2001) (citing some of these studies).
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issue.216 Thus, a plaintiffs’ attorney in a Rule 10b-5 case may focus
closing argument upon the magnitude of the plaintiffs’ financial injury
and elide the causation issue altogether. This practice is common sense
evidence that something is amiss in human causal reasoning that carries
important implications for our civil and criminal justice systems.
Sabovich similarly argues that people’s tendency to impute more
causation where defendants’ conduct is more blameworthy leads
plaintiffs’ attorneys to finesse the causation issue by focusing evidence
and arguments on that bad conduct,217 and argues that judgments in
Benedictin and breast implant products liability cases are strong
examples of this phenomenon.218 Judges, of course, are also subject to
these same influences.219
Alicke explains, as we have seen above,220 that normative
expectations can create a propensity to blame human agents and to
downplay mitigating circumstances. This suggests that if jurors learn
that a speeding driver was involved in an accident, they are likely to
blame his speeding, which generally is “highly diagnostic of causing car
accidents,” and to ignore subsequent information about poor weather
conditions unless the latter is so strong that it overwhelms the former.221
Thus, if a defendant’s misstatements did inflate earnings, which is
generally diagnostic of securities fraud, jurors may tend to ignore
evidence of sector-wide factors or general economic conditions that also
may have affected a firm’s stock price, unless evidence of these other
conditions was sufficient to utterly swamp the evidence related to the
false statements.
Event schemas, Alicke also suggests, can involve observers’ intuitive
understanding of social motivation. He argues that if jurors know that
Person A is jealous of Person B, they typically assume that Person A
216. Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 82.
217. James M. Sabovich, Petition Without Prejudice: Against the Fraud Exception to NoerrPennington Immunity from the Toxic Tort Perspective, 17 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 36 (2008).
218. Id. at 36. See also Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: Testimony on Causation
in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993) (observing that attorneys for plaintiffs in
Bendectin cases “often attempted to commingle elements, thereby bolstering weak evidence on
causation with stronger proof of breach of duty and damages”).
219. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. In Rule 10b-5 litigation, the Goldman Sachs
case mentioned earlier may also be an example. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
Goldman Sachs’s alleged conduct in the case was particularly egregious (selling instruments to
clients that it had gone short on), and the court’s holding on the loss causation issue was so
relatively forgiving compared to most other cases that one may reasonably suspect that culpable
causation bias was in action. See Dondona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d
624, 638–39, 649–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing and analyzing loss causation).
220. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
221. Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note 140, at 569.
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intentionally provoked Person B when a fight subsequently occurred.222
In this way, if jurors learn that a CEO has overstated earnings and
enjoys performance-linked bonuses, they may be especially likely to
blame that overstatement for a subsequent price drop unless information
about an overall economic slump overwhelms that information. And if
jurors believe that CEOs tend to be overpaid and greedy, then they may
be even more likely to blame their actions, rather than general market
conditions, for stock price drops.
If plaintiffs’ attorneys can induce jurors to feel sorry for investors
who have lost their investments, their clients may benefit. Because of
their preexisting beliefs and schemas, people “tend to maximize the
evidence that supports reaching conclusions they believe to be fair, and
to minimize the evidence that supports conclusions that they believe not
to be fair.”223 Thus, experiments “show how jurors selectively use
evidence to support outcomes they think are just.”224
Mitchell speculates on how salience might skew causal thinking in a
situation involving potential securities fraud:
Thus, salient, spectacularly bad events such as Enron’s collapse may
assume much greater importance in the mind of a counterfactual
theorist than statistical evidence about the infrequency of corporate
collapses or the prevalence of corporate fraud, even if the salient
events are unrepresentative of the category of behavior or outcomes in
question. A corporation operating in the same economic and legal
environment as Enron, but committing no apparent illegalities and
only providing investors with “adequate” returns, prompts few to
imagine counterfactual scenarios in which these adequate returns
become pitiful.225

And one cannot forget the fundamental attribution error, which states
that people think that, because someone may have done a bad thing, he
or she is a bad person and is the cause of a bad outcome. As Levinson
and Peng have noted, “[g]iven that the [fundamental attribution error]
frequently causes jurors to make internal attributions in perceiving

222. Id. at 559.
223. Solan, Cognitive Foundations, supra note 99, at 1026.
224. Id. at 1025 (citing Kristin L. Sommer et al., When Juries Fail to Comply with the Law:
Biased Evidence Processing in Individual and Group Decision Making, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 309 (2001)). However, because PSLRA provisions are likely to make a hedge
fund the face of a class action lawsuit rather than a widow, orphan, or grandmother, this sort of
pro-plaintiff sympathy might not be as easy to drum up as it once was. The PSLRA instructed
judges naming securities fraud class action representatives to presume that the largest investors
would have the most at stake and therefore be the best representatives for the class. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006).
225. Mitchell, supra note 127, at 1566–67 (footnote omitted).
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defendants as but-for causes, fewer cases are excluded from the legal
process than a non-biased inquiry would warrant.”226 The same is true
of the other phenomena discussed above—jurors may tend to find
causation in situations where it is unwarranted.
This is, of course, all quite speculative. The evidence for the
psychological tendencies discussed is generally quite strong, but exactly
how it will impact securities litigation and, in particular, reasoning
about the loss causation element is uncertain. Still, it is clear that
people’s causal reasoning is far from perfect. As Solan notes, people’s
“perceptions of what happened need not be accurate. We can attribute
an event to someone because a causal schema is present, but we can be
wrong about causation in this particular instance. In other words, we
are all causal profilers in everyday life.”227
To the extent that plaintiffs’ attorneys could focus jurors’ attention
upon the actions of defendants (and away from background general
economic factors), especially where the defendants acts were
particularly culpable (culpable causation) or easily characterized as
deviating from the norm (normality bias),228 the plaintiffs’ injuries are
particularly severe (severity effect), or the defendant is effectively
painted as a bad person (fundamental attribution error), jurors may draw
causal conclusions where they are not truly justified.
B. Anti-Plaintiff Bias
1. Jurors
While the previous Section explored the evidence for the claim that
the relatively high standard of proof for the loss causation element in
securities fraud suits is justified by the fact that jurors and others are
prone to various psychological and cognitive errors that can cause them
to find causation where none exists, it turns out that one may make a
pretty strong argument on the other side. Indeed, I have argued in a
similar context that related biases can cause jurors and others to blame
the victim, and that might mean that defendants are not so
disadvantaged after all and may not need the protection of a stringent
burden of proof for loss causation.229
226. Levinson & Peng, supra note 10, at 207 (emphasis added).
227. Solan, Cognitive Foundations, supra note 99, at 1009 (citing Alicke, Culpable Control,
supra note 140, at 567).
228. See Feigenson, On Social Cognition, supra note 140, at 77 (“Aware of people’s tendency
to determine causation using the simulation heuristic, the persuasive [legal] writer should attempt
to tell a story about the accident that portrays the other party’s conduct as notably deviant.”).
229. See Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses, supra note 5, at 405–08. Much of the following
discussion is adapted from this article.
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After thirty years of teaching securities regulation, I know that
students often muster a grudging admiration for the clever crook and
blame the victim for his or her gullibility, asking incredulously: “How
could they be so stupid?”230 It turns out that there is a strong human
tendency to blame the victim in a wide variety of settings, such as the
potential bias jurors may feel against plaintiffs.231
[J]urors may believe that the plaintiff, because he started the suit, is
more aggressive and demanding, and that this aggressive stance is due
to negative traits (hostility toward the defendant or greed) rather than
to the demands of the role (suing is how you get things done in the
legal system); consequently, jurors may be biased against plaintiffs.232

Furthermore, because of the overoptimism bias,233 people tend to
believe that they would never be victims of the fraud and other
wrongdoing that has happened to plaintiff.234 They may then reason: if
this wouldn’t happen to me, but it did happen to plaintiff, then the
plaintiff’s own judgments and actions must have caused his or her loss.
This tendency is reinforced by the illusion of control235—people’s
pervasive tendency to believe that they control their environments in
ways that they truly do not, and therefore that they can avoid
victimization and other losses in ways that they actually cannot.236

230. This student view is confounding because it seems obvious to me that the merely
ignorant or careless investor deserves protection from the blatant fraudster.
231. For example, if jurors identify more with perpetrators than with victims, they will
naturally have a tendency to blame the victim. Solan, Cognitive Foundations, supra note 99, at
1005.
232. Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 136.
233. Just as people tend toward overconfidence, see supra notes 163–64 and accompanying
text, they also tend toward overoptimism—believing that the cancer, car wrecks, and other bad
things that happen to other people will not happen to them. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E.
Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at
the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (reporting that people realize
that half of married couples will divorce but place their own chance at zero); BAR-GILL, supra
note 127, at 57 (“The prevalence of the optimism bias has been confirmed in multiple studies.”);
Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 134, at 96 (“The tendency towards
optimism is ubiquitous in human self-perception.”); Sunstein, supra note 127, at 12 (“In some
domains, people show unrealistic optimism.”).
234. Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses, supra note 5, at 404.
235. Pursuant to the illusion of control, people tend to think that they have more control over
outcomes—even chance outcomes like the flip of a coin—than they actually do. See SCOTT
PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 170–71 (1993); KEITH E.
STANOVICH, HOW TO THINK STRAIGHT ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 177 (6th ed. 2001).
236. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627,
639 (1996) (“A fair body of research suggests that people (perhaps especially those high in social
and economic status) exhibit a predictable overconfidence in their ability to control future events
and avoid risks.”).
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People not only tend to believe that they would not be victimized as
plaintiffs have been; they need to believe it. For people to think that
they might be similarly victimized is extremely uncomfortable for them,
so they look to find ways to blame plaintiffs for their own losses.
Psychologists call this tendency defensive attribution, in that people
attempt to differentiate themselves from victims so that they do not feel
vulnerable to a similar fate.237 Thus, as psychological research
indicates, people “frequently blame victims for their fate because they
do not want to accept that such things can happen to them by chance
and out of the blue.”238 Indeed, studies show that people often—as the
severity of a plaintiff’s injuries increases, and the psychological
discomfort that people feel rises—assign more blame to the plaintiff.239

237. See Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on
Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 597, 612 (1997) [hereinafter Feigenson, Blameworthiness] (“By blaming the
victim, observers distance themselves from him or her, preserving their belief that they will not
find themselves in the same position.”); Salminen, supra note 150, at 1198 (finding that accident
victims tended to attribute causation to external factors, but coworkers and foremen tended to
attribute causation to the victim’s own actions).
238. See Gurnek Bains, Explanations and the Need for Control, in ATTRIBUTION THEORY,
supra note 133, at 126, 131, 134 (noting that many studies support these motivational factors, but
that others finding the same effect attribute it to cognitive factors, such as a belief that serious
crimes are rare so more responsibility must lie with the victims of such crime); accord Tom R.
Tyler & Victor Devinitz, Self-Serving Bias in the Attribution of Responsibility: Cognitive Versus
Motivational Explanations, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 408, 413 (1981) (finding more
evidence for cognitive explanations).
As a vivid example, consider the infamous McDonald’s hot coffee case that spawned so many
urban legends. The vast majority of people who heard about Stella Liebeck and her claims
against McDonald’s were happy to leap to the conclusion that she was to blame for her own
serious injuries. They wished to blame Mrs. Liebeck for her own stupidity rather than to consider
that they themselves might fall victim to a serious injury in that way. One of the jurors even
admitted that before she heard the evidence, she thought “it was a ridiculous lawsuit.” Mark
Curriden, “Runaway” No More: Despite Reputation, Juries Getting Less Likely to Give Big
Awards or Buy Novel Defenses, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 8, 2000, at 1A (quoting juror Betty
Farnham). My experience is that many years later, people are often still extremely vitriolic in
their condemnation of Liebeck’s “greed” in bringing the lawsuit and are more than happy to
absolve McDonald’s for selling coffee that was twenty degrees hotter than that sold by
competitors, for ignoring 700 coffee burn complaints in the previous year, or for refusing an
opportunity to settle the case by paying plaintiff’s modest medical expenses. See Andrea Gerlin,
A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 1, 1994, at A1.
239. See Feigenson, Blameworthiness, supra note 237, at 608 (finding that mock jurors’
“judgments on fault and damages show a fairly consistent antiplaintiff effect” and that the
“percentage of fault attributed to the victim, which ought to be affected only by legal
blameworthiness, is significantly greater when the victim’s injuries are more severe”); Walster,
supra note 143, at 77 (presenting the classic study showing that the worse the consequences of an
accidental occurrence, the greater the tendency of others to assign responsibility to the accident
victim and explicating the defensive attribution theory). But see Shaver, supra note 150, at 111
(“[I]ncreasing severity of outcome does not reliably produce correspondent increments in
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Yet another factor underlying the “blame the victim” tendency is
people’s psychological need to believe in a “just world,” which often
causes people to derogate rather than sympathize with plaintiffs.240
People need to believe that the world they live in is fair and that its
processes and systems are just.241 Their desire to believe that they live
in a just world, where good things happen to good people and bad
things happen to bad people, causes them to have an innate inclination
to blame the victim.242 People have great difficulty believing that a
perfectly innocent person can suffer misfortune.243 If “we can find a
way to blame the victim of a bad event, by focusing on his or her bad
disposition or flawed choice, we can assure ourselves that the world is
just and maintain our firm grip on the reins of destiny.”244
One more factor derives from the impact of counterfactual thinking.

attributed responsibility.”).
240. See MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION
39–41 (1990) (questioning whether “the motivation to find injustice in our world could lead to the
perpetuation of the very social stereotypes [that] stand as a major impediment to the creation of
actual social justice”); Avani Mehta Sood & Kevin M. Carlsmith, Aggressive Interrogation and
Retributive Justice: A Proposed Psychological Model, in IDEOLOGY, supra note 135, at 574, 594
(“One corollary to the [just world] belief is that a bad event may be taken as evidence that the
recipient of that event deserved the outcome. Hence, there is a human proclivity to ‘blame the
victim.’”).
241. Adam Benforado, Don’t Blame Us: How Our Attributional Proclivities Influence the
Relationship between Americans, Business and Government, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 509,
521 (2010). See also Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 134, at 102 (noting
that the “‘just world hypothesis’ has recently been substantially advanced by contemporary social
psychologists who study the operations and influences of our thinking about the social systems
with which we identify”); John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, The Psychology of System
Justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology, 13 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 115–16
(2002) (describing the just world theory); Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World
Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1030
(1978) (same).
242. See Benforado, supra note 241, at 540 (noting that people’s strong motivation to believe
in a just world “can naturally result in us blaming the victim when bad things happen”);
Feigenson, Rhetoric of Torts, supra note 133, at 137 (suggesting that jurors might put the blame
on plaintiffs, in part, because “just world” theory leads people to believe that bad things happen to
bad people, so the plaintiff must be a bad person (also called the fundamental attribution error));
Solan, Cognitive Foundations, supra note 99, at 1005 (similar).
243. See Benforado, supra note 241, at 521 (arguing that people tend to be “strongly resistant
to the notion that grievous harms can arise from the chance interaction of elements in our
situations as opposed to human malfeasance” (citing P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND
RESENTMENT, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT AND ACTION (P.F. Strawson ed.,
1968))); STANOVICH, supra note 235, at 177–78.
244. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 135, at 303–04. See Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson,
The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413
(2006) (discussing how people who believe they are fair and just often blame victims and excuse
the perpetrators because the recognition of suffering and inequalities creates a dissonance among
human beings who wish for justice).
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Some evidence indicates that the more a person identifies with a victim,
the more that person will, when engaging in counterfactual reasoning,
think about ways the victim might have avoided the accident, which can
lead them to focus on the victim as the cause of the accident.245
People’s need to make themselves feel comfortable in their
environment—coupled with the overconfidence bias, the illusion of
control, and their desire to feel free from potential victimhood and to
believe that they live in a just world—all factor together to make it easy
for jurors and others to tend to blame investors for their own losses.
These influences are so strong that victims even tend to blame
themselves for things that clearly are not their fault.246
It is no wonder that jurors might blame investors for their own losses
when cancer victims often attribute their illness to their own
misconduct,247 parents often blame themselves for their children’s
serious illnesses,248 women in low paying jobs come to believe that they
deserve lower wages than men,249 and even rape victims often blame
themselves250 much as they are often blamed by others for their own

245. See Christopher T. Burris & Nyla R. Branscombe, Racism, Counterfactual Thinking, and
Judgment Severity, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 980 (1993); Hanson & Yosifon, Situational
Character, supra note 134, at 69 n.307 (“‘A disturbing implication of these findings is that the
more one identifies and emphasizes [sic] with a victim, the more likely one is to contemplate how
the victim might have behaved otherwise and therefore to blame the victim.’” (quoting ZIVA
KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 151 (1999))). See also Christopher G.
Davis et al., Self-Blame Following a Traumatic Event: The Role of Perceived Avoidability, 22
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 557 (1996) (arguing that respondents’ self-blame for
spinal cord injury was due to people’s perceptions of avoidability); Michael W. Morris et al.,
Choosing Remedies After Accidents: Counterfactual Thoughts and the Focus on Fixing “Human
Error,” 6 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 579 (1999).
246. See Bains, supra note 238, at 128 (“[A] number of studies suggest that individuals
frequently blame themselves for accidents and illnesses to which they fall victim.”); Ronnie J.
Bulman & Camille B. Wortman, Attributions of Blame and Coping in the “Real World”: Severe
Accident Victims React to Their Lot, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 351, 360 (1977)
(finding that victims of serious accidents who blame themselves are better at coping with their
misfortune).
247. See Ruth D. Abrams & Jacob E. Finesinger, Guilt Reactions in Patients with Cancer, 6
CANCER 474, 475–76 (1953) (noting that over half of the patients interviewed “reproached
themselves” for having done something to cause their own cancer).
248. See Paul Chodoff et al., Stress, Defenses and Coping Behavior: Observations in Parents
of Children with Malignant Disease, 120 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 743, 747 (1964) (noting that selfblame “can serve the defensive purpose of denying the intolerable conclusion that no one is
responsible, and therefore that neither expiation nor propitiation can undo a malign event [that]
has come about impersonally and meaninglessly”).
249. See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1136 (2006).
250. See Andrea Parrot, Medical Community’s Response to Acquaintance Rape
Recommendations, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 304, 306 (Andrea Parrot &
Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991). Why in the world would rape victims blame themselves? Like all
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misfortune.251 Studies indicate that when the causes of accidents are
thought to be human agency, “victims blame themselves nearly twothirds of the time.”252 These tendencies result in only a small
percentage of personal frauds that occur ever being reported.253 Finally,
jurors’ “blame the victim” frame of mind will likely be exacerbated by
the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys are among the most despised groups in
America;254 the securities law’s plaintiffs’ bar has been particularly
demonized.255
All these factors may well lead people to draw causal inferences in a

of us, they feel the need to control their environment in order to feel safe:
Wortman argues that tendencies towards self-blame are also to be found among victims
of rape, natural disasters and those who are made redundant. She suggests that one
way of explaining such counter-intuitive findings may lie in the fact that, by blaming
themselves for these unfortunate events, the victims reject the notion that they could
occur by chance and, more importantly, preserve the view that in the future such
calamities can be avoided by taking appropriate actions.
Bains, supra note 238, at 129 (citing Camille B. Wortman, Causal Attributions and Personal
Control, in I NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 23–48 (John H. Harvey et al. eds.,
1976)). See also Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 427–29 (1996) (noting the impact of
fundamental attribution error on juror thinking in rape cases).
251. See Linda Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape Judgments: An
Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 402,
406–07 (1997) (noting several studies finding substantial blaming of the victim in rape cases).
252. Feigenson, Melodrama, supra note 139, at 784.
253. See Heith Copes et al., Reporting Behavior of Fraud Victims and Black’s Theory of Law:
An Empirical Assessment, 18 JUST. Q. 343, 352 (2001) (finding that only twenty-four percent of
fraud victims reported the crime).
254. Due to the aggressive public relations campaigns of insurance companies and other tort
reformers, the vision of a civil justice system that has gone terribly wrong “has become a part of
contemporary American mass culture.” Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It
Has Had Is Between People’s Ears:” Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 491 (2000). See also Feigenson, Melodrama, supra note 139, at 781–82
(noting that contemporary images of greedy, undeserving plaintiffs give corporate defense
attorneys a ready, plausible story to tell juries); Michael Freedman, Judgment Day, FORBES, May
14, 2001, at 132 (“Plaintiff lawyers: They are the folks everybody loves to hate.”); Evan P.
Schultz, It’s the Lawyers, Stupid: Presidential Wannabes Miss the Mark When They Take Aim at
Attorneys, N.J. L.J., Aug. 28, 2000, at 891 (noting that political candidates try to make hay by
lawyer-bashing).
255. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of
Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 449, 478 (2001) (“This ‘tarring’ of the plaintiffs’
bar has been immensely successful.”); Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private
Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055, 1069 (1999) (“In an era of pervasive demonization of attorneys, the private securities
lawyer became the caricature of the greedy, self-serving destroyer of upstanding captains of
industry.”); Peter Lattman, Investors’ Billion-Dollar Fraud Fighter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, at
B1, B9 (quoting law professor J. Robert Brown as saying that the “securities class-action bar has
come under relentless assault over the years,” but noting that recently there has been a “shift in
the public image and reputation of the securities class-action bar” toward the better).
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manner detrimental to plaintiffs. This will not happen inevitably or
universally, but a substantial impact seems likely.
2. Judges
One other point to keep in mind is that jurors will not make most
meaningful causation decisions in most Rule 10b-5 cases. Rather,
federal district judges will make these decisions at the motion to dismiss
or summary judgment stage. As noted earlier,256 Dain Donelson and I
argued in a recent paper that the law of pleading scienter against
independent auditors in Rule 10b-5 cases is hopelessly ambiguous, that
this ambiguity creates nearly unfettered discretion for federal judges,
and, of particular relevance to this Section of this Article, that discretion
tends to disadvantage plaintiffs.257
There is no need to repeat in detail all the points we made in that
article. But it bears mentioning that multiple studies show that judges,
like jurors, are generally as prone to using the heuristics and being
affected by the biases that have been identified by Kahneman, Tversky,
and others.258 Like other human decision makers, in making causation
decisions, judges will tend to make decisions in a self-serving way,
consistent with their preexisting beliefs and schemas.259 There also is
overwhelming empirical evidence that judges’ decisions are affected,
probably subconsciously, by their political orientation.260 As the

256. Donelson & Prentice, supra note 68.
257. Id. at 488.
258. See id. and sources cited therein.
259. See supra note 223. See also Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights into Judicial
Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits Cases: Lessons from Conkright v. Frommert, 3 AM. U.
LAB. & EMP’T L. F. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2139205 (“The cultural world view of judges unavoidably influence them, especially
where judges have gaps in their legal knowledge or are encountering new types of information for
the first time. The resulting legal opinions are written in a manner that is congenial to their
preexisting cultural values.”).
260. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior, in IDEOLOGY, supra
note 135, at 705, 705 (“[E]xplanations of judicial behavior that fail to incorporate ideology are
incomplete at best.”); Josh Furgeson & Linda Babcock, Legal Interpretation and Intuitions of
Public Policy, in IDEOLOGY, supra note 135, at 684, 695 (“We believe judges’ decisions can be
explained by motivated reasoning and the associated cognitive biases in processes used to search
for, evaluate, and retrieve information. This biased processing can cause judges to unknowingly
conflate seemingly necessary legal outcomes with the policies they simply prefer.”) Eric D.
Knowles & Peter H. Ditto, Preference, Principle, and Political Casuistry, in IDEOLOGY, supra
note 135, at 341, 357 (“Legal scholars have long noted the tendency for political ideology to
influence even the highest level of judicial reasoning.”). See also EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW,
POLITICS & PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 4–5
(2009); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3, 45 (2006); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995) (studying
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federal judiciary has become increasingly conservative over the past
thirty years,261 plaintiffs have had a tougher time in many areas,262
including federal securities cases, where federal judges “routinely
express concern that securities class actions are often lawyer-driven
suits brought in the hope of settling for their nuisance value.”263
Consider that Professor Langevoort and his colleagues found in an
empirical study that federal judges use the “fraud by hindsight”
doctrine, which relates to pleading scienter in Rule 10b-5 causes of
action, almost exclusively in cases where the hindsight bias (which is
mitigated by the doctrine) might benefit plaintiffs, and almost never in
cases where the hindsight bias might benefit defendants.264 Also, Jack
Coffee has been recently cited for his concern that the D.C. Circuit,
which has overturned a string of SEC rules in recent years, is trying to
return to the Lochner era.265

influence of judges’ attitudes on civil rights cases); James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility
Toward Labor Unions?: Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1761 (1999) (finding numerous personal and political background factors that
affected judges’ decisions in cases involving unions); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
Judicial Partnership and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998) (“Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts
review agency discretion.”); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law:
What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001)
(reporting on a study that found political affiliation helped predict votes in labor-management
disputes dispositions); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 813 (2008) (finding significant differences between voting of
Republic and Democratic judges); Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of
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Putting all this together, one may argue that it is plaintiffs, rather than
defendants, in Rule 10b-5 cases who need to worry about judicial
lawmaking regarding causation, obviating the need for such a strict
standard of proof on the issue as that announced in Dura and as applied
by the lower courts in recent years.
CONCLUSION
Rather than relax the causation standards of the common law—which
would be consistent with the overall goal of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act to increase investor protection from what had come
before—the courts, and eventually Congress, adopted a relatively
demanding standard requiring plaintiffs to plead and prove both
transaction causation and loss causation in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud
cases. Is this sensible?
The psychological evidence indicates that people have many
limitations when it comes to reasoning about causation. Among other
tendencies, people often ascribe more causality to human actions than to
background factors, more to actions than to inactions, more to abnormal
factors than to normal factors, more to factors they expect to see than
those that they don’t, more to factors that fit their preconceived notions
than those that don’t, more to those that fit a self-interested explanation
than those that don’t, and more to causes that are simple than those that
are complex. Indeed, adults may even exhibit “magical thinking” in
drawing causal inferences.266 Because many of these tendencies can be
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Its Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, at B1 (same). See also Miles & Sunstein, supra note 260, at
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manipulated to disadvantage defendants, creating an illusion of
causation where none exists, one can argue that a demanding causation
standard in Rule 10b-5 cases is well justified as a means of protecting
defendants from semi-frivolous litigation.
Yet, the evidence regarding people’s inclination to “blame the
victim” constitutes a counterweight to this initial conclusion. Perhaps it
is securities fraud plaintiffs rather than securities fraud defendants who
need the law tilted in their direction.
Overall, the evidence is sufficiently speculative that there is no strong
case for changing the status quo. The evidence, however, makes it clear
that jurors’ and judges’ ability to accurately draw causal connections is
seriously bounded, which does not lend confidence to the results of our
judicial system, particularly in complicated cases such as Rule 10b-5
class actions.
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